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크로츠너, '바젤 II 도입' 주제 연설문(원문)

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Governor Randall S. Kroszner
At the Standard & Poor's Bank Conference 2007, New York, New York
November 13, 2007

Implementing Basel II in the United States

Good afternoon. I would like to thank Standard and Poor's for the invitation to speak today at this impressive conference. I am quite pleased to be able to offer some remarks on Basel II implementation in the United States. I am even more pleased that in today's speech I can now talk about U.S. implementation of Basel II in the present tense, since within the past ten days each of the U.S. banking agencies approved the U.S. final rule for Basel II. While work on Basel II--for both bankers and supervisors--is far from complete, adoption of the Basel II rule is nevertheless a very important accomplishment.

I would also like to offer thanks and extend congratulations to all the parties involved in the successful adoption of Basel II. This includes staff at each of the U.S. banking agencies, who worked tirelessly and with incredible determination and patience to see this rulemaking to its completion, as well as the principals at the other agencies, who worked very hard to find common ground and develop a rule that would serve the public interest and satisfy each of our agencies' objectives. Of course, I would also like to thank the many industry participants--some of whom may be here today--who spent considerable time and effort providing valuable comments on our proposals over the past several years. Your contributions made the final rule a much better product. Developing Basel II was like running a marathon, and even though some of us may have hit the wall and wanted to drop out at mile 20, we persevered and successfully reached the finish line. I am proud of what we have all accomplished.

Completion of the U.S. Final Rule
In the banking industry, most of the innovation and evolution in risk-management practices occur on a continuous basis, generally in small steps. Updates to banking regulations, on the other hand, typically occur in large jumps. As was the case with Basel I nearly twenty years ago, I consider the adoption of Basel II to be a major step forward in banking regulation in the United States. Importantly, we are also working on an additional proposal, known as the standardized approach, to offer non-core banks a set of regulatory capital requirements that have more risk sensitivity than the current Basel I rules, but less complexity than the advanced approaches in the Basel II final rule.

One of the main reasons we were able to complete the Basel II final rule successfully, I believe, was our renewed focus on the fundamental rationale for developing Basel II: enhancing the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system by providing more-risk-sensitive capital requirements for our largest, most complex banks and improving risk management practices at those institutions. Moreover, we endorsed the notion that the U.S. rule would foster international consistency and be less burdensome on banks if it adhered more closely to the international Basel II framework finalized in 2006--and if it also aligned as closely as possible with what banks themselves were doing for risk management.

These were principles that I emphasized as I represented the Federal Reserve in interagency discussions, and I believe my counterparts shared these views. Perhaps our ability to refocus stemmed from a fresh set of comments received on our proposals, our renewed commitment to getting things right, and the infusion of some new approaches brought to the table. Regardless, we of course owe a huge debt of gratitude to our predecessors, who broke the hard ground in the long U.S. rulemaking process.

Reasons for Adopting Basel II
I would like to return briefly to our reasons for adopting Basel II, since it is useful to remember why we undertook so much effort to see it through. While the existing Basel I capital regime was a major step forward when introduced in 1988, it has become outdated for large, complex banking organizations. Retaining Basel I for these institutions would have widened the gap between their regulatory capital requirements and their actual risk profiles, generating further incentives for regulatory arbitrage to take advantage of that gap.

In contrast to the simple risk-bucketing approach of Basel I, in which exposures to obligors of varying creditworthiness were given the same capital treatment, the new Basel II rules require banks to distinguish among the credit quality of individual borrowers. For example, under Basel I almost all first-lien residential mortgage exposures are subject to the same risk weight regardless of the borrower's creditworthiness, whereas Basel II provides for a more refined differentiation of low- versus high-credit-quality mortgage borrowers. Likewise, Basel I is inadequate for dealing with capital markets transactions such as highly structured asset-backed securities. Basel II, on the other hand, provides a much more refined approach by requiring banks to hold capital commensurate with the actual risks of such transactions. Recent market events highlight why a robust and independent assessment of risk on the part of banks is so important. The enhanced risk-sensitivity of the Basel II advanced approaches creates positive incentives for banks to lend to more-creditworthy counterparties and to lend against good collateral, by requiring banks to hold more capital against higher-risk exposures.

The Federal Reserve's role as the nation's central bank reinforces our belief in the importance of maintaining prudent and risk-sensitive capital requirements for financial institutions. Financial stability is enhanced when banks' regulatory capital measures adequately reflect risk, as well as when banks continually improve their risk-management practices. Since the Basel II regime is far superior to the current Basel I regime in aligning regulatory capital requirements with risk and fostering continual improvements in risk management for our largest and most complex banking organizations, I believe it will contribute to a more resilient financial system as a whole.

In addition, let me emphasize that the Basel II regulatory capital framework establishes a more coherent relationship between regulatory measures of capital adequacy and the day-to-day risk management conducted by banks. That is, it builds on risk-management tools, such as credit-risk rating systems and economic capital, that are already in use at sophisticated financial institutions. As a result, Basel II will be better able than the current system to adapt over time to innovations in banking and financial markets and will reduce incentives for arbitrage that arise from the gap between what the regulators require and what sound economic risk management requires.

Moving Ahead with Basel II Implementation
Next Steps for Supervisors
I used the analogy of running a marathon earlier, describing how the final rule represented a finish line of sorts for the U.S. banking agencies. Alas, I'm afraid that we cannot rest because in fact we have simply passed the baton from the runner in the first stage of the race--rule finalization--to the runner in the next stage--implementation. Successful implementation of Basel II will require additional hard work and determination. As most of you know, the agencies have for some time been preparing for Basel II implementation by working to integrate Basel II into our day-to-day supervisory processes. With completion of the final rule, we must now be ready to pace ourselves through another long, intensive, but ultimately rewarding, effort.

The agencies are already working hard to foster consistency across banks and across the agencies. We are building upon the cooperation already established through our work on the final rule and our efforts to prepare supervisory staff for the Basel II qualification process. Our supervisory staffs have been meeting regularly for some time to align qualification approaches, iron out any differences, and ensure that each bank subject to Basel II is treated appropriately and consistently. We also remain attentive to the way in which the framework is implemented in other countries, so that we can minimize the burden placed on banks by having to meet multiple national rules. I hope our decision to align the definition of default for wholesale exposures more closely with the definition used internationally, for example, sends a positive signal about our intentions to increase cross-border consistency and reduce unnecessary burdens that can distract banks from one of the fundamental goals of Basel II--improving risk management.

Of course, the agencies need to move ahead with Basel II implementation carefully and with our eyes wide open. The advanced approaches are a significant change from our current, time-tested, risk-based capital rules, and we have therefore embedded the transitional safeguards set forth in the agencies' 2006 proposal into the U.S. Basel II rule. These safeguards will help ensure that capital levels remain strong and that we have sufficient opportunity to assess the framework before full implementation. Importantly, we also are retaining the leverage ratio and our existing prompt-corrective-action framework.

As noted in the agencies' July press release, we are committed to a robust and transparent study of the framework during the transitional phase to assess its overall effectiveness, and we will address any material deficiencies that we identify. This study should include active and meaningful dialogue among the agencies, the industry, market participants, Congress, and other interested parties. This is consistent with my view that whenever regulators undertake a major regulatory change, a careful and thorough empirical review of the effectiveness of the regulation is extremely valuable. Such a review can help assess whether the goals for the rule are being met, whether the benefits of the rule exceed the costs, and how the rule can be made more effective and less burdensome.

In addition to this study, during and after the transitional phase we will be relying upon ongoing, detailed analyses to evaluate continuously the results of the new framework in operation. A primary objective of this ongoing review will be to ensure that capital levels remain prudent. For example, we will respond if we see unreasonable declines in capital requirements at individual institutions that do not appear to be supported by either those banks' own internal capital-adequacy assessments or by our supervisory view of those institutions' risks and how well those risks are managed.

As has long been the case with our capital rules, we expect that adjustments to the capital framework will be made over time to address industry and market developments, any potential shortcomings in the rule identified in our review and analysis during implementation, and new and improved techniques of risk management.

Next Steps for Bankers
Completion of the Basel II rulemaking process means that banks adopting the new rule must also gear up their efforts. Of course we recognize the substantial work that bankers have undertaken over the past several years to prepare themselves for Basel II. But, understandably, they have had to wait for completion of the final rule to see how the agencies would articulate certain requirements--some of them quite detailed. Therefore, it would seem that bankers need to read the rule very carefully and take time to understand how their own bank will be able to meet its requirements.

As stated in the final rule, and as the U.S. agencies articulated several years ago, the key instrument in the qualification process is a bank's implementation plan. This written implementation plan, approved by a bank's board of directors, must describe in detail how the bank complies, or intends to comply, with the rule's qualification requirements.

Specifically, the plan must describe how the bank intends to address the gaps it has identified between its existing practices and the qualification requirements set forth in the rule for the advanced approaches, covering all consolidated subsidiaries. The implementation plan also must include objective, measurable milestones--including delivery dates--and a target date when the bank expects its advanced approaches to be fully operational. The bank must establish and maintain a comprehensive and sound planning and governance process to oversee implementation efforts, and must demonstrate to its supervisor that it meets the qualification requirements.

Banks subject to the final rule on a mandatory basis, the core banks, have up to six months to adopt an implementation plan. Of course, banks may always submit their plans earlier, and I understand that a number of core banks are working toward that goal. This deadline for submission of plans by core banks is intended to prevent delays in starting implementation efforts. However, the final rule provides flexibility and gives banks adopting Basel II ample time to fully meet the qualification requirements once they have adopted an implementation plan. Specifically, a bank's plan may include developmental goals for full implementation for up to thirty-six months from the effective date of the final rule.

As supervisors, we will take the qualification requirements seriously, expecting banks to meet both the letter and the spirit of those requirements. Thus, we strongly recommend that banks undertake their own sober and frank appraisal of their ability to meet the final rule. Systems development can take time, for example, and it is important to make sure that these systems function appropriately. While I believe that expeditious adoption of Basel II will have significant benefits, it is of the utmost importance that the implementation not be rushed but be undertaken thoughtfully and deliberately.

After a bank has submitted a credible implementation plan to its primary supervisor, it must then begin a parallel run lasting at least four consecutive calendar quarters, during which the bank's supervisor must determine the bank's compliance with the qualification requirements to be satisfactory. During the parallel run, a bank remains subject to the Basel I risk-based capital rules for all applicable regulatory and supervisory purposes, but the bank also must calculate its capital ratios using the advanced approaches and report pertinent information to its supervisor. It is only upon notification from its supervisor that a bank can move into a series of three transitional periods (each lasting at least one year), during which the cumulative reductions of the bank's risk-based capital requirements are limited. Supervisory approval is needed to move to a subsequent transitional floor-level and then to move from the transitional floors to stand-alone use of the Basel II rules.

Importantly, as bankers move forward with implementation, they should not lose sight of Pillars 2 and 3, which may ultimately be more important to the success of Basel II than Pillar 1, which has received the bulk of the attention so far. Under Pillar 2, banks are required to have an internal process--which will be subject to rigorous supervisory review--for ensuring that they are holding enough overall capital to support their entire risk profile. Thus, Pillar 2 should be a key area of focus for banks implementing Basel II. The preamble to the final rule describes the steps that supervisors will take under Pillar 2, namely that supervisors will take into account a bank's internal capital-adequacy assessment process--known as its ICAAP--as well as the bank's compliance with the minimum capital requirements set forth in this rule, and all other relevant information.

The agencies expect banks to implement and continually update the fundamental elements of a sound ICAAP--identifying and measuring material risks, setting capital-adequacy goals that relate to risk, and ensuring the integrity of internal capital-adequacy assessments. A bank is expected to hold adequate capital against all of its material risks, particularly those risks not covered or not adequately quantified in the risk-based capital requirements--such as liquidity risk or interest-rate risk in the banking book. In general, a bank's ICAAP should reflect an appropriate level of conservatism to account for uncertainty in risk identification, risk mitigation or control, quantitative processes, and any use of modeling. In most cases, this conservatism will result in levels of capital or capital ratios above minimum regulatory requirements to be regarded as adequate.

Pillar 3 is a key mechanism for banks to communicate to market participants about their risk profiles, their associated levels of capital, and the manner in which they are meeting the requirements in the final rule. In addition to providing information about its various components of regulatory capital and its minimum capital requirements and ratios, a bank must disclose information about how it measures and manages credit risk, operational risk, equity risk, and interest-rate risk in non-trading activities, as well as the range of risks related to securitizations. For example, a bank has to describe the operation of its credit risk rating system as well as the data used in parameter estimates for credit losses.

Some of these disclosure requirements will be new for banks but others are already required by, or are consistent with, existing U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements, or bank regulatory reporting requirements. As a strong believer in market discipline and the importance of information in market transactions, I believe Pillar 3 will improve bank disclosures about risk profiles and enhance discussions between bankers and market participants about risk-management practices.

Of course, while we want to promote consistency, we must also allow bankers some flexibility in meeting the Basel II requirements and permit a reasonable amount of diversity of practices across banking organizations. Such flexibility will allow banks to use and readily improve their existing risk-measurement and risk-management practices. More to the point, as supervisors we should actively encourage such improvements. As we move forward, we encourage banks to raise issues as they try to meet the rule's requirements; in other words, we want banks to maintain an ongoing dialogue about implementation with their supervisors, who stand ready to answer questions and assist banks in interpreting Basel II requirements.

Standardized Approach Proposal for Non-Core Banks
Before concluding, I would like to discuss the agencies' additional plans for revising capital rules, specifically plans for those banks not subject to the advanced approaches of Basel II. Some commentators on the earlier Basel II and Basel IA proposals voiced concerns that adoption of a new capital framework for the largest and most complex U.S. banking organizations could disadvantage other U.S. banking organizations, particularly the smaller banks. We understand that banks not required to adopt Basel II are facing a choice about whether to opt-in to the advanced approaches. Some of these banks may be sophisticated institutions that exhibit sound risk management but do not quite meet the criteria to be core banks. The agencies recognize that such institutions should be afforded an alternative for more-risk-sensitive capital requirements, but one that is not as complex as the advanced approaches.

In this regard, the agencies have responded by committing to proposing a "standardized" approach instead of Basel IA. Specifically, the staffs are currently working on a notice of proposed rulemaking that would implement some of the simpler approaches for both credit risk and operational risk from the Basel II framework--referred to as the standardized approach. The proposal is being developed as an optional risk-based capital framework for all banking organizations that are not required to adopt the advanced approaches. We also expect to retain our existing Basel I-based regulatory capital framework for those smaller banks that would prefer to remain under that regime.

The proposal for the standardized approach will take into consideration relevant commentary received in response to the Basel IA and Basel II proposed rules that were published in late 2006 and should, in essence, modernize the Basel I-based rules without imposing a substantial implementation burden. Among other things, the proposal is being designed both to provide greater differentiation across corporate exposures based on borrowers' underlying credit quality and to recognize a broader spectrum of credit-risk mitigation techniques. The agencies are also considering how to implement Pillars 2 and 3 of the Basel II framework in the standardized proposal in a manner that is commensurate with banks' complexity and risk profiles. Our goal is to realize the benefits of these two pillars without imposing excessive regulatory burden and without creating competitive advantages or disadvantages for different types of banks.

I expect this proposal to be presented to the Board for consideration within the next several months, and I encourage all interested parties to review and comment on this proposal once it has been issued. We are keenly aware of the need for capital requirements to make sense from the standpoint of both safety-and-soundness and competitiveness; we recognize that a one-size-fits-all approach is probably not the best for our banking system, in light of our wide range of institutions. We remain sensitive to the principle that if we have multiple regulatory capital frameworks, they must work together to improve the safety and soundness of our entire banking system without artificially creating competitive inequalities. Our goal is to have the standardized approach ready for implementation concurrently with the start of the first Basel II transition phase.

Conclusion
The U.S. banking agencies have reached an important milestone in adopting the final rule for Basel II. Our focus on the fundamentals of improving risk management consistent with safety and soundness, and on international consistency, has been key to achieving this success. Obviously, however, effective implementation of Basel II is as important as, if not more important than, the rulemaking process. It is imperative that we observe how the new rule works in practice--assessing carefully both its advantages and its limitations. I am confident that both banking organizations and the supervisory community are up to the challenge. It is also important to modernize the existing Basel I-based regulatory capital framework to improve the risk sensitivity of capital requirements at the non-core banks, by offering a standardized option.

Finally, we should all bear in mind that implementation of Basel II--and, more significantly, the improvements in risk measurement and management that will be required--will not be a one-time event, but rather an ongoing process. Basel II is designed to accommodate innovation and change as markets and risk-measurement and -management evolve over time. As one marathon is completed, yet another begins.

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정동영 업무보고 논란 [서울=뉴스핌] 유신모 외교전문기자 = 청와대 영빈관에서 5일 열린 외교·안보 분야 정부 부처의 대통령 업무보고에서 정동영 통일부 장관의 '한반도 평화공존 발전 구상'과 업무보고 발언이 논란을 빚고 있다. 이날 정 장관의 발언 중에는 정부 내 조율을 거치지 않은 사안을 정책으로 추진하겠다고 공언한 것이 있는가 하면 사실 관계에 맞지 않은 설명도 있었다. 이재명 대통령은 공개적으로 신중을 기해 달라고 경고했고, 조현 외교부 장관은 '이상주의적 희망에 근거한 비현실적 구상'이라는 비판을 내놨다. 그동안 정 장관의 대북 정책 관련 발언이 물의를 빚은 적은 여러 번 있지만 대통령과 유관 부처 장관이 공개적으로 부정적 입장을 표명한 것은 이례적이다. 정 장관의 무리한 대북 접근법과 월권을 제어해야 한다는 목소리도 높아지고 있다. [정동영 통일부 장관이 지난달 23일 오후 서울 종로구 정부서울청사에서 취임 1주년 기자간담회를 하고 있다. [사진=통일부] 2026.07.23 ◆통일부 장관 권한 넘어선 주장 정 장관은 이날 업무보고에서 '한반도 평화공존 발전 구상'을 설명하면서 이재명 정부 2년차 핵심 과제로 상호 존중·평화적 갈등 해결·핵 없는 한반도 등 3대 기본 방향을 제시했다. 정 장관은 "대결과 혐오의 언어는 멈춰야 한다"면서 주적 용어 대체를 주장했다. 지난 25년간의 CVID(완전하고 검증가능하며 되돌릴 수 없는 비핵화) 구도는 이미 무너졌다고도 했다. 또 "현 시점에서 흘러간 선(先)비핵화만 되뇌는 것은 현실을 바꾸는 데 힘이 되지 않는다"고 주장했다. 정 장관은 또 "정전 체제를 평화 체제로 바꾸는 논의에 착수하겠다"면서 "북·미 정상회담 견인과 함께 4자 대화의 동력을 확보하기 위해 최선을 다할 것"이라고 말했다. 하지만 이 대통령은 정 장관의 구상에 대부분 제동을 걸었다. 이 대통령은 "평화공존 정책이 정치적으로 악용되는 측면이 있다"며 "많이 조심하셔야 한다"고 지적했다. 북한을 다른 이름으로 불러야 한다는 주장에는 "표현에 꼬투리가 잡혀 정쟁으로 휘몰아 들어가면 원래 하고자 했던 데에서 오히려 나쁜 상황이 초래될 수 있다"고 경고했다. 이 대통령은 남북 신뢰 구축을 위해 9·19 군사합의를 선제적으로 복원해야 한다는 정 장관의 주장에 대해서도 "우리의 선의대로 하는 게 과연 한반도의 평화와 안정에 플러스냐, 결론적으로 약간의 의문이 들 때도 있다"며 부정적으로 반응했다. 조현 외교부 장관은 업무보고 사후 브리핑에서 정 장관이 언급한 '4자 회담'에 대해 "이상주의에 근거한 어떤 희망이라 하더라도 그건 아직 조율되지 않은 방법"이라며 "여러분들께서 디스카운트해 주시면 좋겠다"고 선을 그었다. 정 장관이 9월 러시아 블라디보스토크에서 열리는 '동방경제포럼(EEF)'을 언급하며 "정부 차원에서 (참석을) 검토하고 있다"고 발언한 데 대해서도 조 장관은 "그것은 외교부의 몫"이라며 "아직 거기까지 진도가 나가지 않았다"고 잘랐다. 정 장관이 이날 소개한 대북 구상과 설명은 정부 내 조율을 거치지 않았다는 점에서 문제가 있다. 특히 주적 표현 대체와 국호 사용, 9·19 군사합의 복원, 4자회담 추진 등은 통일부 장관이 결정할 사안이 아니어서 월권이라는 지적이 나오고 있다. 이 대통령은 정 장관의 업무보고를 듣고 난 뒤 "여기 업무보고에 발표했다고 승인난 건 아니다"라고 재차 확인했다. 정부의 한 소식통은 "정 장관의 발언 내용은 대부분 국가안전보장회의(NSC)를 거쳐 결정된 사안이 아닌 정 장관의 개인적 생각에 가깝다"며 "안보 관련 부처 장관이 정부의 공식 정책이 아닌 사안을 추진하겠다고 업무보고를 하고 대통령의 면전에서 '국군통수권자가 나서야 한다'고 주장한 것은 심각한 문제"라고 지적했다. 이재명 대통령이 5일 청와대 영빈관에서 열린 통일 외교 국방 등 외교 안보 부처 업무보고에서 발언하고 있다. [사진=청와대] 2026.08.05 ◆시대착오적 접근, 대북 인식 오류 더욱 문제인 것은 정 장관의 이같은 주장이 현 시점에서 이미 참고가 될 수 없는 과거의 경험 또는 사실과 다른 인식에 기반하고 있다는 것이다. 정 장관이 주장하는 구상은 급격히 변화하고 있는 북한의 전략과 한반도 및 국제 정세를 전혀 반영하지 못하고 있다는 비판이 제기되고 있다. 정 장관이 "흘러간 선(先)비핵화만 되뇌는 것은 현실을 바꾸지 못한다"고 언급한 것은 지금까지의 대북 접근법을 호도하고 있다. 북핵 위기 발발 이후 지금까지 모든 핵 협상에서 한국이나 미국은 북한에 선비핵화를 공식적으로 요구한 적이 없기 때문이다. 지금까지의 북핵 협상은 북한의 비핵화 조치에 한·미가 상응하는 대가를 제공하는 방식으로 이뤄졌다. 1994년 북·미 제네바 기본합의는 핵시설 동결과 중유 제공의 교환이었다. 2005년 9.19 공동성명도 북한의 비핵화 조치의 모든 단계에 상응조치를 제공하는 '행동 대 행동' 원칙이 적용됐다. 대북 협상에 관여했던 한 전직 관료는 "모든 북핵 협상은 북한의 비핵화 조치와 한·미가 제공하는 상응조치를 어떻게 정교하게 배열하느냐가 관건이었다"면서 "정 장관의 발언은 지금까지 한·미가 북한에 먼저 핵을 포기해야 대화할 수 있다는 정책을 고수해 현 상황에 이르게 됐다는 잘못된 인식에서 비롯된 것으로 보인다"고 말했다. 정 장관이 "지난 25년간의 CVID 구도가 무너졌다"고 말한 것도 비핵화의 개념에 대한 이해 부족이라는 비판이 제기되고 있다. 북핵 문제에 정통한 외교 소식통은 "어떤 명칭을 붙이든 핵을 제거한 뒤 이를 검증하고 재발 방지 조치를 하는 것은 비핵화에 반드시 포함되어야 하는 기본적 절차"라며 "CVID는 안 된다고 말하는 것은 북한의 비핵화 조치를 검증도 하지 않고 언제든 되돌릴 수 있도록 합의하자는 말과 같다"고 지적했다. [서울=뉴스핌] 이길동 기자 = 조현 외교부 장관이 5일 오후 서울 종로구 정부서울청사 별관에서 2026년 하반기 업무보고 사후브리핑을 하고 있다. 2026.08.05 gdlee@newspim.com ◆안보 리스크 키우는 통일부 장관 정 장관은 지난해 취임 직후부터 청와대와 외교부를 제치고 통일부가 북한과 관련된 모든 정책을 주도해야 한다는 주장을 펴면서 단독 질주를 거듭해왔다. 북한의 '적대적 두 국가' 주장을 변형한 '평화적 두 국가'를 지향해야 한다고 주장하면서 이에 문제점을 지적하는 목소리를 무시했다. 외교부가 미국과 북한 문제를 논의하는 것에 대해 "한반도 정책과 남북관계는 주권의 영역이며 동맹국과 협의의 주체는 통일부"라고 주장해 물의를 빚었다. 문재인 정부 시절 한·미 워킹그룹이 남북관계 파탄 원인이었다고 사실과 다른 주장을 폈다. 지난해 업무보고에서는 국제정세를 감안하지 않고 남북대화 재개에만 초점을 맞춘 비현실적 내용으로 논란을 빚었다. 정부 내 조율도 거치지 않고 독자 대북제재인 5·24 조치를 해제하고 9·19 군사합의 비행금지구역 복원을 추진하겠다는 방침도 밝혔다. 지난 4월에는 평안북도 구성시에 우라늄 농축 시설이 있다고 말해 파장을 일으켰다. 미국은 이 발언을 계기로 한국과 대북정보 공유를 제한했다. 이 조치는 지금도 계속되고 있는 것으로 알려졌다. 정 장관이 이처럼 정부의 공식 결정을 거치지 않은 사안을 정부 정책인 것처럼 주장하며 좌충우돌하는 배경에 대해 여러가지 해석이 나온다. 북한 문제에서 조기에 성과를 거둬야 한다는 조급증과 자신의 존재감 과시 욕구가 작용하고 있다는 평가가 많다. 일각에서는 정 장관이 2007년 민주당 대선후보였을 때 이재명 대통령이 캠프에서 비서실 부실장으로 활동한 전력이 있다는 것을 들어 "정 장관이 아직도 이 대통령을 아랫사람으로 생각하고 있는 것 아니냐"는 비판을 내놓기도 한다. 한·미 관계와 북한 문제를 오래 다뤘던 전직 관료 출신의 한 전문가는 "정 장관 취임 후 지금까지의 언행은 잘못된 현실 인식에 따른 독단과 앞서 가기, 월권 등으로 점철돼 있다"면서 "통일부 장관이라는 중요한 직책에 있으면서 스스로 안보 리스크를 키우는 역할만 했다"고 비판했다. opento@newspim.com 2026-08-06 06:10
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6월 경상수지 최대 흑자 [서울=뉴스핌] 박가연 기자 = 지난 6월 우리나라의 경상수지가 전월에 이어 역대 최대 흑자를 기록했다. 반도체를 중심으로 한 정보기술(IT) 품목 수출 호조로 월간 상품수출이 처음으로 1000억달러를 넘어선 영향이다. [자료=한국은행] 한국은행이 6일 발표한 '2026년 6월 국제수지(잠정)'에 따르면 지난 6월 경상수지는 497억3000만달러 흑자로 집계됐다. 전월(386억1000만달러)에 이어 두 달 연속 월간 기준 역대 최대 기록을 갈아치웠다. 이에 따라 올해 상반기 누적 경상수지 흑자는 1910억1000만달러를 기록했다. 경상수지 흑자를 견인한 것은 상품수지다. 6월 상품수지는 478억9000만달러 흑자를 기록하며 전월에 이어 역대 최대를 다시 썼다. 국제수지 기준 상품수출은 1123억7000만달러로 전년 동월 대비 84.5% 증가하며 월간 기준 처음으로 1000억달러를 넘어섰다. 상품수입은 644억8000만달러로 38.6% 늘었다. 통관 기준으로는 반도체 수출이 전년 동월 대비 196.9% 급증했고 컴퓨터·주변기기(SSD)는 282.7% 증가했다. IT 품목 수출은 160.4% 늘었으며 비IT 품목도 ▲석유제품(47.5%) ▲화공품(18.6%) ▲철강제품(17.9%) ▲승용차(6.1%) 등을 중심으로 18.6% 증가했다. 통관 기준 수입은 ▲원자재(30.5%) ▲자본재(35.3%) ▲소비재(16.4%)가 모두 늘었다. 서비스수지는 12억9000만달러 적자를 기록해 전월(-10억9000만달러)보다 적자 폭이 확대됐다. 여행수지는 외국인 입국자 증가와 유류할증료 인상 등에 따른 출국자 감소로 4억4000만달러 흑자를 기록했지만 지식재산권사용료수지는 전월 흑자에서 4억4000만달러 적자로 전환됐다. 본원소득수지는 배당소득을 중심으로 32억7000만달러 흑자를 기록해 전월(21억7000만달러)보다 흑자 폭이 확대됐다. 배당소득수지는 배당수입이 늘어난 데다 전월 분기배당에 따른 기저효과로 배당지급이 줄면서 25억6000만달러 흑자를 나타냈다. 금융계정 순자산은 6월 중 467억1000만달러 증가해 월간 기준 역대 최대 증가 폭을 기록했다. 종전 최대였던 올해 3월(369억9000만달러)을 넘어선 것이다. 직접투자에서는 내국인의 해외투자가 80억1000만달러, 외국인의 국내투자가 46억3000만달러 각각 증가했다. 증권투자에서는 외국인의 국내 주식 매도세가 이어졌다. 외국인의 국내 주식 투자는 차익실현 매도 등의 영향으로 316억1000만달러 감소하며 전월(-310억5000만달러)에 이어 역대 최대 순매도 기록을 다시 경신했다. 외국인의 국내 채권투자는 세계국채지수(WGBI) 자금 유입에도 분기 말 만기도래 영향으로 증가 폭이 줄어든 52억9000만달러를 기록했다. 내국인의 해외 증권투자는 주식을 중심으로 35억6000만달러 증가했다. eoyn2@newspim.com 2026-08-06 08:00
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  • Lockheed Martin Corp. Industrials
    우크라이나 안보 지원 강화 기대감으로 방산 수요 증가 직접적. 미·러 긴장 완화 불확실성 속에서도 방위산업 매출 안정성 강화 예상됨.

부정 영향 종목

  • Caterpillar Inc. Industrials
    우크라이나 전쟁 장기화 시 건설 및 중장비 수요 불확실성 직접적. 글로벌 인프라 투자 지연으로 매출 성장 둔화 가능성 있음.
이 내용에 포함된 데이터와 의견은 뉴스핌 AI가 분석한 결과입니다. 정보 제공 목적으로만 작성되었으며, 특정 종목 매매를 권유하지 않습니다. 투자 판단 및 결과에 대한 책임은 투자자 본인에게 있습니다. 주식 투자는 원금 손실 가능성이 있으므로, 투자 전 충분한 조사와 전문가 상담을 권장합니다.
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