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Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke

At the Fourth Economic Summit, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, California
March 2, 2007

Globalization and Monetary Policy

My topic this evening is the implications of ongoing global economic integration “globalization” for short--for U.S. monetary policy. At the broadest level, globalization influences the conduct of monetary policy through its powerful effects on the economic and financial environment in which monetary policy must operate. As you know, several decades of global economic integration have left a large imprint on the structure of the U.S. economy, including changes in patterns of production, employment, trade, and financial flows. Other than by contributing to general economic and financial stability, monetary policy can do little to affect these structural changes or the powerful economic forces that drive them. However, to make effective policy, the Federal Reserve must have as full an understanding as possible of the factors determining economic growth, employment, and inflation in the U.S. economy, whether those influences originate at home or abroad. Consequently, one direct effect of globalization on Federal Reserve operations has been to increase the time and attention that policymakers and staff must devote to following and understanding developments in other economies, in the world trading system, and in world capital markets.

A narrower question, but one that is critical for monetary policy makers, is whether the increased openness of the U.S. economy has in some way affected the ability of the Federal Reserve to meet its congressional mandate to foster price stability and maximum sustainable employment. On this issue, some analysts have argued that globalization hinders monetary policy--for example, by reducing the ability of the Federal Reserve to affect U.S. interest rates and asset prices or by diminishing the role of domestic factors in the inflation process.

You will not be surprised to hear that the Federal Reserve System is quite interested in the implications of globalization for the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy. Members of the Board staff have conducted extensive research on the topic, and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco--which is deeply engaged in Asia-Pacific issues--has been a leader in this area as well. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has created a Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, which will support the study of globalization’s effects on policy and the economy, and a number of other Reserve Banks have undertaken similar efforts.

In the remainder of my talk I will discuss two channels through which globalization may have affected the transmission and effectiveness of U.S. monetary policy. First, I will consider whether the globalization of finance has weakened or otherwise affected the ability of U.S. monetary policy to influence domestic financial market conditions. Second, I will discuss what we know about the way international factors influence the determination of inflation, a key goal variable for monetary policy.

Globalization, Monetary Policy, and Financial Markets
Monetary policy works in the first instance by affecting financial conditions, including the levels of interest rates and asset prices. Changes in financial conditions in turn influence a variety of decisions by households and firms, including choices about how much to consume, to produce, and to invest. Anyone who participates in financial markets these days is aware that these markets transcend national borders and are highly sensitive to economic and political developments anywhere in the world. Does financial globalization significantly reduce the influence of the Federal Reserve on financial conditions in the United States and thereby possibly make U.S. monetary policy less effective?

Certainly, the financial environment in which U.S. monetary policy is made has been irrevocably changed by the remarkable increases in the magnitudes of financial flows into and out of the United States. A quarter-century ago, foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets were limited, and therefore, the influence of foreign investors and foreign financial conditions on U.S. financial markets was in most cases relatively modest. As I have already noted, that situation has changed markedly, as global financial markets have become increasingly integrated and both foreign and domestic investors have become more diversified internationally. Today, foreigners hold about one-quarter of the long-term fixed-income securities issued by U.S. entities of all types and more than half of publicly-held U.S. Treasury securities. Cross-border financial flows are enormous and growing: For example, in 2006, foreigners acquired on net more than $1.6 trillion in U.S. assets, while U.S. investors purchased more than $1 trillion in foreign assets. Given their scale, capital inflows and outflows certainly influence long-term U.S. interest rates and other key asset prices, both by affecting the underlying supply-demand balance between saving and capital investment and by helping to determine the premiums that investors receive for holding assets that are risky or illiquid.

How does all this affect monetary policy? It is helpful to think about the potential implications of globalized financial markets for monetary policy by beginning with the first stages of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In particular, as you know, the Federal Reserve influences financial conditions through its ability to control the federal funds rate, the interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight. Through the use of open-market operations and other techniques, the Federal Reserve can manage the supply of funds in the interbank market as needed to keep the federal funds rate close to its target, a capability that has not been affected by the increased international integration of financial markets. Although the federal funds rate does not itself have a major influence on economic activity, other short-term rates--such as Eurodollar rates--are determined largely by the current and expected future values of the funds rate, reflecting the close substitutability of alternative short-term sources of funding. The Federal Reserve’s ability to control the federal funds rate thus gives it a strong influence over other short-term dollar nominal interest rates and, to the extent that inflation is inertial or sticky in the short run, over short-term real interest rates as well.

The Fed’s ability to set the short-term interest rate independently of foreign financial conditions depends critically, of course, on the fact that the dollar is a freely floating currency whose value is continuously determined in open, competitive markets. If the dollar’s value were fixed in terms of another currency or basket of currencies, the Fed would be constrained to set its policy rate at a level consistent with rates in global capital markets. Because the dollar is free to adjust, U.S. interest rates can differ from rates abroad, and, consequently, the Fed retains the autonomy to set its federal funds rate target as needed to respond to domestic economic conditions.

Short-term interest rates affect the domestic economy through a number of channels (for example, by affecting the cost of holding inventories), so monetary policy could influence economic activity to some degree even if its control were limited to the short end of the yield curve. Moreover, the pricing of some putatively long-term financial assets may be strongly influenced by shorter-term rates. Thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages provide one example. Because people move or refinance their loans, leading them to prepay their mortgages, and because the pattern of real mortgage payments is more front-loaded than that of nominal payments, the effective duration of a thirty-year mortgage may be closer to five years than to thirty years.

Nevertheless, the ability to influence longer-term interest rates and the prices of longer-term assets is an important component of the Fed’s toolkit for managing aggregate demand. What are the implications of increased global financial integration further along the transmission mechanism? The globalization of financial markets does at times make the Fed’s analysis of financial and economic conditions more complex. The behavior of long-term interest rates over the past few years is a case in point. Compared with historical averages, long-term nominal interest rates have remained relatively low in recent years--the phenomenon that the previous Chairman, Alan Greenspan, termed a “conundrum”--even as the Federal Reserve was withdrawing monetary accommodation by raising the target for the federal funds rate by more than 400 basis points. As a consequence, the Treasury yield curve has become inverted--that is, long-term rates have been lower than short-term rates, another historically unusual pattern. Developments in global capital markets have contributed significantly to these outcomes. For example, strong foreign demand for U.S. long-term debt has been one factor tending to reduce the term premium, the extra return that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. All else equal, a smaller term premium implies a lower level of long-term interest rates. At the same time, increases in the net supply of saving in global capital markets--which, to a significant extent, are a product of the large current account surpluses of some emerging-market economies and of oil-producing nations--have resulted in lower real long-term interest rates both in the United States and abroad. Clearly, to understand and evaluate the behavior of the term structure and to assess the implications of current yields for the domestic economy, the Fed must take into account the various effects of foreign capital flows on U.S. yields and asset prices, a task that can be quite challenging.

With globalized financial markets comes increased financial interdependence. One statistical indicator of that interdependence is that the correlations between long-term interest rates in the United States and those in other industrial countries are high and appear to have risen significantly in the last few years. For example, from 1990 to 2006, the daily correlation between changes in ten-year swap rates in the United States and Germany averaged 0.42, a relatively high value. During the last three years of that period, however, that correlation rose to 0.65, an increase that is both economically and statistically significant. Similar results obtain for the correlation of U.S. yields with yields of other industrial countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan. That interdependence suggests that monetary policy makers must pay attention to conditions abroad as well as at home.

However, the greater analytical complexity and interdependence associated with the globalization of financial markets notwithstanding, both theory and--perhaps more persuasively--recent experience support the view that the Federal Reserve retains considerable leverage over longer-term rates and key asset prices, although the links from monetary policy decisions to longer-term rates are somewhat looser than those to short-term rates. In particular, by employing consistent and predictable policies, the Fed can help to shape market participants’ views of how future nominal short-term rates are likely to evolve and how they are likely to respond to economic developments. Because long-term nominal interest rates can be viewed as the sum of a weighted average of expected future short-term nominal interest rates plus a term premium, Federal Reserve policies and communications substantially influence the behavior of these rates. In analogous fashion, the Fed’s ability to influence real interest rates at shorter horizons provides a lever for affecting longer-term real yields. Like nominal long-term yields, real long-term yields can be viewed as an average of current and future expected short-term real rates, so that the effects of monetary policy on shorter-term real yields feed into longer-term yields as well. Well-anchored inflation expectations are also helpful in this regard: If expectations of long-term inflation are stable, then changes in long-term nominal interest rates translate into similar changes in long-term real rates.

The empirical literature supports the view that U.S. monetary policy retains its ability to influence longer-term rates and other asset prices. Indeed, research on U.S. bond yields across the whole spectrum of maturities finds that all yields respond significantly to unanticipated changes in the Fed’s short-term interest-rate target and that the size and pattern of these responses has not changed much over time (Kuttner, 2001; Andersen and others, 2005; and Faust and others, 2006). Empirical studies also find that U.S. monetary policy actions retain a powerful effect on domestic stock prices.1

If globalization has not constrained the ability of U.S. monetary policy to influence domestic financial conditions, why are long-term interest rates and key asset prices so correlated across economies? One possibility is that economic integration has increased the extent that economic shocks--to the oil market, for example--have global rather than purely local effects and that most of the world’s central banks are guiding their policy response in similar ways to such shocks. Recent research suggests another possibility, which is that U.S. monetary policy actions may have significant effects on foreign yields and asset prices as well as on domestic financial prices. For example, changes in U.S. short-term interest rates seem to exert a substantial influence on euro area bond yields (Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon, 2005; Faust and others, 2006) and appear to have a strong effect on foreign equity indexes as well.2 In contrast, the effects of foreign short-term rates on U.S. asset prices appear to be relatively weaker. These cross-border effects of policy, and their asymmetric nature, are somewhat puzzling. One would expect a more symmetric relationship between the United States and the euro area, for example, as the two regions are of comparable economic size. It will be interesting to see if these relationships persist.

I draw two conclusions on this issue. First, the globalization of financial markets has not materially reduced the ability of the Federal Reserve to influence financial conditions in the United States. But, second, globalization has added a dimension of complexity to the analysis of financial conditions and their determinants, which monetary policy makers must take into account.

Has Globalization Affected the U.S. Inflation Process?
Other than through its influence on financial markets, globalization may also have affected the operation of monetary policy by changing the relative importance of the various factors that determine the domestic inflation rate.3 As national markets become increasingly integrated and open, sellers of goods, services, and labor may face more competition and have less market power than in the past. In particular, prices and wages may depend on economic conditions abroad as well as on conditions in the local market. These linkages suggest that, at least in the short run, globalization and trade may affect the course of domestic inflation.

International factors might affect domestic inflation through several related channels. First, the expansion of trade may cause domestic inflation to depend to a greater extent on the prices of imported goods--not only because imported goods enter the consumer basket or (in the case of imported intermediate goods) affect the costs of domestic production, but because competition with imports affects the pricing power of domestic producers. Second, competitive pressures engendered by globalization could affect the inflation process by increasing productivity growth, thereby reducing costs, or by reducing markups. Third, to the extent that some prices are set in internationally integrated markets, pressures on resource utilization in foreign economies could be relevant to domestic inflation.4

Some analysts might object to the proposition that globalization affects the inflation process at all on the grounds that the structural changes that globalization engenders can affect only the relative prices of goods and services; in contrast, inflation--the rate of change of the overall price level--must ultimately be determined solely by monetary policy (Ball, 2006). Certainly, monetary policy determines inflation in the long run, and the central bank must take responsibility for the inflation outcomes generated by its policies. For example, the opening of trade with emerging-market economies that have low labor costs may reduce the relative prices of imported manufactures, but if the long-run inflation objective of the central bank is held constant, then the ultimate effect of the lower import prices on inflation will be nil as changes in other prices offset the effect of import prices.

However, the conclusion that inflation is determined only by monetary policy choices need not hold in the short-to-medium run. In the shorter term, central banks do not usually offset completely the effects of shocks to supply or prices--of which a change in the relative price of imports is an example--in part because any monetary action made in response will take time to be effective. Consequently, such shocks may affect domestic inflation for a time. More subtly, a central bank following a strategy of “opportunistic disinflation” might react to a favorable shock to supply or prices by lowering its medium-term objective for inflation (Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002). In the case of a central bank pursuing such a strategy, foreign factors that depress domestic inflation may have a persistent effect so long as inflation exceeds the central bank’s long-term objective.5

What, then, is the evidence for the view that globalization is affecting the inflation process in the United States? Of the various channels that have been suggested, probably the most intuitive is the idea that greater openness to trade has increased the influence of import prices on domestic inflation. In the major industrial economies over the past decade or so, import prices--particularly the prices of imported manufactured goods--have generally risen at a slower rate than other consumer prices, slowing overall inflation. The slower growth in import prices reflects to some extent rapid productivity gains in the production of manufactures, an important component of trade.6 Increased exports by low-cost emerging-market economies have also helped keep down the prices of imports received by the United States and other industrialized countries. Indeed, the share of U.S. non-oil imports coming from the emerging Asian economies has increased from 27 percent to 34 percent over the past decade or so.

Overall, research indicates that trade with developing economies in particular has slowed the rate of growth of import prices faced by industrialized countries, with estimates of the reduction ranging widely from 1/2 to 2 percentage points. One study, for example, estimated that trade with China alone has reduced annual import price inflation in the United States by about 1 percentage point over the period 1993-2002 (Kamin, Marazzi, and Schindler, 2006)7. However, imported goods make up only part of what people consume, and so the effect on overall inflation is less than the deceleration in the prices of imports alone. Typical estimates of the short-term effect on the overall inflation rate of less-rapid increases in the prices of imports stemming from trade with China are in the neighborhood of 0.1 percent or less per year--a discernable but certainly not a large effect.

This result requires several qualifications. First, the direct effect of lower import prices on overall consumer price inflation could understate the overall effect, if lower import prices force competing domestic firms to restrain their prices as well. Research has generally found that import prices do affect the prices charged by domestic producers.8 For example, the International Monetary Fund found that, in a range of industrial economies, the prices of domestic products were restrained by competition from imports, the effect being larger with greater penetration (IMF, 2006). To the extent that import competition slows the rate of increase of domestic prices, the tendency of lower-cost imports to reduce domestic inflation will be enhanced.

On the other hand, not all aspects of globalization and trade reduce inflation. For example, globalization has been associated with strong growth in some large emerging-market economies, notably China and India, and this growth likely has contributed to recent increases in the prices of energy and other commodities. During 2003-05, for example, China alone accounted for nearly one-third of the growth in both global real gross domestic product (GDP) and oil consumption. It is difficult to assess the exact extent to which increased demand by developing countries has contributed to the run-ups in commodity prices in recent years, as these prices are also affected by supply conditions and other factors. However, one study estimated that, if the share of world trade and world GDP enjoyed by non-industrial countries had remained at its 2000 levels, then by 2005 real oil prices would have been as much as 40 percent lower, and real metals prices 10 percent lower, than they actually were (Pain, Koske, and Sollie, 2006). Accordingly, in the past several years, the effect of growth in developing economies on commodity prices has been a source of upward pressure on inflation in the United States and other industrial economies.

When the offsetting effects of globalization on the prices of manufactured imports and on energy and commodity prices are considered together, there seems to be little basis for concluding that globalization overall has significantly reduced inflation in the United States in recent years; indeed, the opposite may be true. That said, the integration of rapidly industrializing economies into the global trading system clearly has had important effects on the prices of both manufactures and commodities, reinforcing the need to monitor international influences on the inflation process.

Globalization also may affect the inflation process through other channels. Some researchers, for example, have suggested greater openness to trade and the resulting increase in competition may have led to reduced markups of price over cost (Chen, Imbs, and Scott, 2004). However, the rise in profit rates in recent years seems inconsistent with the view that markups have declined (Bowman, 2003; Kohn, 2006).9 The competition fostered by trade should also promote productivity growth, reducing growth in costs and making the attainment of low inflation easier. That productivity growth is linked to the intensity of competition is plausible, and more-rapid productivity growth seems to help to explain the slowing of inflation in the United States in the mid-1990s. However, the fact that most other industrial countries did not experience the same increase in productivity growth as the United States during that period, even as they became more open to trade, suggests that the relationship between productivity and trade may be complex.

In a globalized economy, the level of resource utilization in the world economy is another potential influence on domestic inflation. Standard analyses of inflation based on the concept of a Phillips curve assign a role in inflation determination to the domestic output gap--the difference between the economy’s potential output and its actual production. According to this theory, the existence of slack in the economy makes it more difficult for producers to raise prices and for workers to win higher wages, with the result that inflation slows. These conventional analyses have considered only the possible link between domestic inflation and the domestic output gap. But in an increasingly integrated world economy, one may well ask whether a global output gap can be meaningfully defined and measured and, if it can, whether it affects domestic inflation. In other words, all else being equal, would a booming world economy increase the potential for inflationary pressures within the United States?

In principle, with the domestic determinants of inflation held constant, reduced slack in the global economy could increase domestic inflation for a time if it led to higher prices for some traded goods and services relative to the prices of goods and services that are not usually traded. For example, suppose that the United States produces personal computers both for export and for domestic use, and that more-rapid growth abroad increases the world demand for computers. Stronger global demand for computers raises the prices that U.S. producers can charge their foreign customers. Moreover, because all computer producers are facing a stronger global market, U.S. producers can charge more for their output at home as well. If producers of many goods face increases in worldwide demand, the net effect could be higher inflation in the United States, even though there may be no measurable effect on the prices of U.S. imports.

The idea is intriguing but again, unfortunately, the evidence is so far inconclusive. Early work, including some done at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, found no effect of global demand conditions on U.S. inflation, as did most of the subsequent research.10 Recently, however, several researchers affiliated with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have reported results favorable to the global output gap hypothesis (Borio and Filardo, 2006). Using data for sixteen industrialized countries (plus the euro area) for 1985-2005, they found significant effects of the global output gap on domestic inflation rates--indeed, effects that were generally larger than those of domestic output gaps and that were rising over time. This provocative result has in turn been challenged by Federal Reserve Board researchers, who find that the empirical support for a role for the global output gap does not survive modest changes in the way the data are analyzed. As domestic output gaps are difficult to measure, even with the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps not surprising that measuring and assessing the effects of a global output gap have proved contentious. A clear resolution of the question of how global economic conditions affect domestic inflation may continue to elude us.

Overall, global factors do seem to influence domestic inflation. Most directly, increasing trade with China and other developing countries has led to slower growth in the prices of imported manufactured goods. However, this effect has been offset in the most recent period by the increases in the prices for energy and commodities associated with the rapid growth in these emerging market economies. Other, more indirect channels may exist, including the possibilities that trade promotes productivity growth and thus lower costs and that global demand conditions influence domestic pricing decisions. However, more research is needed to pin down the significance of these indirect influences.

Conclusion
I have foreshadowed my conclusions. Without doubt, ongoing global economic integration is a phenomenon of the greatest importance, one that will help shape the U.S. economy for decades. Globalization has not materially affected the ability of the Federal Reserve to influence financial conditions in the United States, nor has it led to significant changes in the process which determines the U.S. inflation rate. However, effective monetary policy making now requires taking into account a diverse set of global influences, many of which are not yet fully understood. The Federal Reserve will continue to place a high priority on understanding the effects of globalization on the U.S. economy in general and on the conduct and transmission of U.S. monetary policy in particular.

References

Andersen, T.G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F.X., Vega, C., (2005). “Real-Time Price Discovery in Stock, Bond and Foreign Exchange Markets,” unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania.

Ball, Lawrence (2006). “Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” NBER Working Paper No. 12687 (November). http://www.nber.org/papers/w12687

Bernanke, Ben and Kenneth N. Kuttner (2005). “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance, vol. 60, pp. 1221-1257. http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2004/200416/200416abs.html

Bowman, David (2003). “Market Power and Inflation,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 783. http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2003/783/default.htm

Borio, Claudio and Andrew Filardo (2006). “Globalisation and Inflation: New Cross-Country Evidence on the Global Determinants of Domestic Inflation,” unpublished paper, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland (March).

Chen, Natalie, Jean Imbs, and Andrew Scott (2004). “Competition, Globalization, and the Decline in Inflation,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4695. www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4695.asp

Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher (2006). “Global Financial Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks,” working paper no. 616, European Central Bank. http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp616.pdf (683 KB PDF)

Ehrmann, Michael, Marcel Fratzscher and Roberto Rigobon (2005). “Stocks, Bonds, Money Markets, and Exchange Rates: Measuring International Financial Transmission,” working paper no. 452, European Central Bank. http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp452.pdf (953 KB PDF)

European Central Bank (2006), “Effects of the Rising Trade Integration of Low-Cost Countries on Euro Area Import Prices,” ECB Monthly Bulletin, Frankfurt, Germany (August), pp. 56-57. http://www.ecb.int/pub/mb/html/index.en.html

Faust, Jon, John H. Rogers, Shing-Yi B. Wang, and Jonathan Wright (forthcoming). “The High-Frequency Response of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements,” Journal of Monetary Economics.

Gamber, Eduard N. and Juann H. Hung (2001). “Has the Rise in Globalization Reduced U.S. Inflation in the 1990s,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 39 (January), pp. 58-73.

Hausman, Joshua and Jon Wongswan (2006). “Global Asset Prices and FOMC Announcements,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 886. http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2006/886/default.htm

Hooper, Peter, Torsten Slok, and Christine Dobridge (2006). “Understanding U.S. Inflation,” Global Markets Research, Deutsche Bank (July 26).

Ihrig, Jane, Steven Kamin, Deborah Lindner, Jaime Marquez (forthcoming). “Some Simple Tests of the Globalization and Inflation Hypothesis,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers.

International Monetary Fund (2006). “How Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April, pp. 97-134. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/index.htm.

Kamin, Steven B., Mario Marazzi, and John W. Schindler (2006). “The Impact of Chinese Exports on Global Import Prices,” Review of International Economics, vol. 14 (May), pp. 179-201.

Kohn, Donald (2006). “The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and their Implications for Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the 51st Economic Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Chatham, Mass., June 16. www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2006/20060616/default.htm.

Kuttner, Kenneth N. (2001). “Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed Funds Futures Market,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 47 (June), pp. 523-44.

Nickell, Stephen (2005). “Why Has Inflation Been So Low Since 1999?” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, London, vol. 45, pp. 92-107.

Orphanides, Athanasios, and David Wilcox (2002). "The Opportunistic Approach to Disinflation," International Finance, vol. 5 (Spring), pp. 47-71.

Pain, Nigel, Isabell Koske, and Marte Sollie (2006). “Globalisation and Inflation in the OECD Economies,” Economics Department Working Paper No. 524, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris (November).

Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack (2004). “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 51 (November), pp. 1553-75.

Rogoff, Kenneth (2003). “Globalization and Global Disinflation,” Paper prepared for the Conference on Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 28-30. http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2003/pdf/Rogoff2003.pdf (237 KB PDF)

Tootell, Geoffrey M.B. (1998). “Globalization and U.S. Inflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic Review (July/August), pp. 21-33. http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1998/neer498b.htm

Yellen, Janet (2006), “Monetary Policy in a Global Environment,” speech delivered at the conference “The Euro and the Dollar in a Globalized Economy,” University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California, May 27. http://www.frbsf.org/news/speeches/2006/060527.pdf (346 KB PDF)

Footnotes

1. The decline of U.S. stock markets to a hypothetical 100 basis point tightening in the federal funds target rate is estimated to be 5.3 percent by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 5.5 percent by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), and 6.2 percent by Rigobon and Sack (2004). Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2005) find similar results.

2. Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2005) find that euro area stock markets drop by nearly 2 percent in response to a hypothetical 100 basis point tightening in the United States on the same day. The estimated effect of euro area monetary policy on U.S. stock markets is much smaller, about 0.5 percent. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) and Hausman and Wongswan (2006) examine the effect of U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises on equity indexes of fifty countries. These studies find that, on average, a hypothetical 25 basis point rise in the federal funds rate is associated with a drop of about 1 percent in foreign equity indexes. Equity indexes in countries with a less flexible exchange rate regime respond more to U.S. monetary policy surprises.

3. Some material in this section reflects research described in Ihrig, Kamin, Lindner, and Marquez (forthcoming). For additional perspective on these issues, see Kohn (2006) and Yellen (2006).

4. This list is not exhaustive. For example, if domestic pricing power is affected by international competition, globalization could affect the relationship between inflation and resource utilization at home.

5. Rogoff (2003) provides an alternative theory of how globalization may affect the central bank’s inflation objective. He argues that deregulation and international integration have led to more flexible prices, so that any attempt by a central bank to stimulate the real economy by allowing inflation to rise unexpectedly will be less effective than it would have been in the past. Because central banks have less incentive to create unexpected inflation, their promises to keep inflation low are more credible, which in turn reduces the cost of keeping inflation low. Accordingly, in Rogoff’s analysis, globalization has led monetary authorities to maintain lower long-term inflation rates. A criticism of this story is that it implies that the Phillips curve is steeper today than in the past (that is, that inflation is more sensitive to slack in the economy), a prediction that does not accord with most empirical studies.

6. The dollar prices of imports are also affected by changes in the value of the exchange rate. However, the effects of exchange-rate changes on the domestic prices of imported goods have been quite low in recent years.

7. The share of imports coming from China is relatively high for the United States, and so the effect of trade with China may be lower for other industrialized countries. For example, one analysis of trade between the United Kingdom and both China and India found that, over the period 1999-2002, the effect on import-price inflation was only about minus 0.5 percentage point annually (Nickell, 2005). Research by the European Central Bank, however, found that the euro area’s trade with a wide range of developing economies had reduced the rate of increase in import prices to the area about 2 percentage points annually over 1996-2005 (European Central Bank, 2006).

8. An exception is Kamin, Marazzi, and Schindler (2006), who find little effect on the prices of domestic U.S. producers of similar goods.

9. Bowman (2003) finds little evidence that competition has increased or that markups declined in industrial economies.

10. Work finding no role or, at best, a marginal one for a global output gap includes Tootell (1998), Hooper, Slok, and Dobridge (2006), Pain, Koske, and Sallie (2006), and Ball (2006). In contrast, Gamber and Hung (2001) find that, over 1976-99, a trade-weighted average of capacity utilization for thirty-five U.S. trading partners is a significant determinant of U.S. inflation.

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20일 상암서 '마이 케이팝 스타' 결선...우승자는 [서울=뉴스핌] 정태이 기자 = 전 세계 60개국의 지원자가 참여한 글로벌 오디션 '마이 케이팝 스타(MY KPOP STAR)'가 최종 우승자를 가린다. 종합뉴스통신사 뉴스핌의 글로벌 오디션 '마이 케이팝 스타' 로고. [사진=뉴스핌DB] 2026.09.15 alice09@newspim.com 종합뉴스통신사 뉴스핌이 주최·주관하고 문화체육관광부가 후원하는 '마이 케이팝 스타'의 오프라인 결선이 오는 20일 오후 3시 서울 마포구 상암동 큐브컨벤션센터에서 개최된다. 이번 오디션은 나이와 국적에 제한 없이 진행됐다. 치열한 예선과 본선을 거쳐 국내 5팀과 해외 5팀 등 총 10팀이 최종 결선에 진출했다. 국내 결선 진출자는 고도아, 박희주, 윤근아, 조하음, 황승대다. 해외에서는 다니 리베라(Dani Rivera·브라질), 샌디 에고(Sandy Ego·이스라엘), 시리나(Shirina·우즈베키스탄), 메이 칫 뗏(Maye Chit Thet·미얀마), 바흐테(Vachte·이란)가 무대에 올라 최종 우승을 놓고 경쟁을 펼친다. 결선을 앞두고 진행된 사전투표에서는 브라질의 다니 리베라가 선두를 차지했다. 지난 12일부터 일주일간 진행된 사전투표에는 총 2만7947표가 모였으며, 다니 리베라는 이 가운데 1만5539표(55.6%)를 얻어 1위에 올랐다. 이어 샌디 에고가 5725표(20.5%)로 2위, 시리나가 4192표(15.0%)로 3위를 기록했다. 국내 참가자 가운데서는 조하음이 862표로 가장 높은 순위인 4위에 올랐다. [서울=뉴스핌] 이지은 기자 = 뉴스핌 주최 글로벌 오디션 '마이 케이팝 스타'의 사전 투표가 끝난 가운데, 브라질의 다니 리베라가 1위를 차지했다. (명령어: 사전투표 결과를 토대로 그래프 이미지를 만들어줘.) [이미지=CHAT GPT] [사진= 2026.11.19 alice09@newspim.com 사전투표에서 선두를 차지한 다니 리베라가 최종 우승까지 이어갈 수 있을지도 관심사다. 이번 대회는 대중의 평가 100%로 우승자를 결정한다. 사전투표 결과는 최종 점수에 10% 반영되며, 결선 당일 현장 투표와 온라인 투표가 각각 45%를 차지한다. 다니 리베라가 사전투표에서 절반 이상의 표를 얻으며 앞섰지만, 현장과 온라인 투표의 반영 비율이 총 90%에 달하는 만큼 결선 당일 결과에 따라 최종 순위가 달라질 수 있다. 이 같은 경쟁 끝에 최종 우승을 차지한 참가자에게는 상금 1억 원이 수여된다. 국내 참가자는 2위부터 10위까지 각각 200만원의 상금을 받으며, 해외 결선 진출자에게는 왕복 항공권과 숙박비 등 체류 비용이 지원된다. 이 밖에도 글로벌 쇼케이스 및 공연 참여 기회, 국내 엔터테인먼트사의 현장 캐스팅 기회 등이 마련됐다. K팝 보컬·댄스 트레이닝과 숏폼 콘텐츠 제작 지원도 제공된다. 국내외 10팀이 최종 무대에서 맞붙는 가운데, 사전투표에서 앞선 참가자들이 우위를 이어갈지, 결선 당일 새로운 우승자가 탄생할지 주목된다. '마이 케이팝 스타' 최종 결선 관람은 공식 홈페이지를 통해 신청할 수 있다. taeyi427@newspim.com 2026-11-19 15:18
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스마트기기 등 수능 부정행위 98명 [서울=뉴스핌] 황혜영 기자 = 2027학년도 대학수학능력시험에서 스마트기기 등 전자기기 관련 부정행위로 98명이 적발됐다. 단순 소지가 93명, 스마트기기 활용으로 분류된 사례가 5건이다. 시험시간 위반 등 일반적인 부정행위는 포함되지 않은 수치로 전체 적발 규모는 추가 집계를 거쳐 공개된다. 최은옥 교육부 차관은 19일 오후 7시 수능 진행 상황 2차 브리핑에서 "지금까지 말씀드린 총 98명은 모두 부정행위자로 처리됐다"며 "스마트기기를 활용한 부정행위자에 대해서는 보다 엄중한 책임을 묻도록 하겠다"고 밝혔다. 집계는 이날 오후 4시 37분 종료된 4교시 기준이다. [서울=뉴스핌] 사진공동취재단 = 2027학년도 대학수학능력시험(수능)이 실시된 19일 오전 서울 용산구 용산고에서 한 감독관이 수험생의 안경을 확인하고 있다. 2026.11.19 photo@newspim.com 이해숙 교육부 고등평생정책실장은 "98명은 전부 스마트기기 관련된 대상자"라며 "시간을 어긴다든가 하는 일반적인 부정행위 유형은 이 통계에 포함돼 있지 않다"고 설명했다. 교육부는 다른 유형의 부정행위도 종합해 추후 발표할 방침이다. 스마트기기 활용으로 분류된 5건은 충남의 스마트안경 사용 1건, 경기의 소형카메라·무선이어폰 소지 1건, 서울의 스마트폰 문제지 촬영 1건, 서울·경기의 화장실 내 스마트폰 사용 각 1건이다. 교육부는 시·도교육청 보고를 바탕으로 분류했으며 증거와 진술서 등을 검토해 최종 판단하겠다고 밝혔다. 중대 사안의 경찰 인계 규모와 고발 일정은 확정해 공개하지 않았다. 이 실장은 "중대한 사항 같은 경우에는 경찰과 관련 사안을 공유받고 있다"며 "구체적인 건수는 지금 보고를 받고 있는 만큼 나중에 정리해서 말씀드리겠다"고 말했다. 이 실장은 적발된 98명 모두가 다음 해 수능 응시 제한 대상인지에 대해 "심의위원회에서 경중을 따지는 절차를 거쳐 결정하게 된다"며 "지금 98건을 콕 집어 얘기하기에는 절차적으로 기다려 봐야 할 것 같다"고 설명했다. 단순 소지로 적발된 93명 가운데 49명은 세 차례 위급재난문자 발송으로 확인됐다. 오전 8시 30분 1차 문자로 31명, 오후 2시 21분 2차 문자로 11명, 오후 2시 57분 3차 문자로 7명이 적발됐다. 나머지 44명은 재난문자와 관계없이 전자기기 소지가 확인됐으며 와이파이 신호 탐지로 적발된 2명도 여기에 포함됐다. 신진용 교육부 대입정책과장은 "49건은 위급재난문자 시 본인 몸이나 복도에 배치된 가방에서 소리가 울린 것이고 44건도 마찬가지로 위급재난문자와 관계없이 소지한 건"이라며 "실제로 활용된 것이라고 판단하는 건들은 5건"이라고 설명했다. [무안·광주=뉴스핌] 박진형 기자 = 2027학년도 대학수학능력시험(수능)일인 19일 전남광주통합특별시 서구 광덕고등학교(26지구 제20시험장) 시험실에서 감독관이 안경을 검수하고 있다. 2026.11.19 bless4ya@newspim.com 스마트폰으로 문제지를 촬영하거나 화장실에서 사용한 수험생들이 재난문자 발송 때 적발되지 않은 경위는 추가 확인하기로 했다. 정부는 재난문자 발송과 함께 모든 시험장에 와이파이·블루투스 신호 탐지 전담 감독관을 추가 배치했다. 이 실장은 "공공와이파이까지 포함해 전체적으로 차단했다"며 "현재 동원할 수 있는 기술이나 방법으로는 최선을 다했다고 생각한다"고 말했다. 한국사 시험 도중 발송된 3차 문자와 관련해서는 외부에서 울린 문자 소리로 시험에 지장이 생겼다면 지체된 만큼 시간을 추가 부여하도록 사전 지침을 내렸다고 설명했다. 실제 시간 보전 사례는 집계 중이다. 교육부와 한국교육과정평가원은 학교의 판단 자료와 결과서를 토대로 1차 심의한 뒤 이의제기와 재심의를 거쳐 최종 처분을 결정한다. 모든 절차는 12월 11일 성적 발표 전에 마무리할 예정이다. 신 과장은 "성적 발표 이전에 마무리해 기존 학생들 성적에 영향 없도록 조치하겠다"고 밝혔다. 최 차관은 "시험 중 소형카메라를 적발하는 등 성실히 감독에 임해주신 감독관분들이 민원·소송 등으로 피해를 입지 않도록 모든 책임을 정부가 지겠다"고 밝혔다. hyeng0@newspim.com 2026-11-19 19:50
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