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[해외경제] 그린스펀, "고유가 우려 불구 70년대 위기는 재연되지 않을 것"

기사입력 : 2005년10월19일 10:36

최종수정 : 2005년10월19일 10:36

고유가는 세계경제 성장을 둔화시킬 수 있고, 계속해서 대체 연료로의 전환을 가속화시킬 것으로 보인다고 앨런 그린스펀(Alan Greenspan) 美 연준 의장이 18일 일본에서 가진 연설을 통해 지적했다.그린스펀 의장은 이날 도쿄에서 일본상공회의소 및 게이단렌(經團聯) 초청 강연에서 "비록 세계경제의 확장 국면이 올해 여름을 거치면서 상당히 강화된 것으로 보이지만, 최근 에너지물가의 급등은 명백히 경제성장을 둔화시킬 것으로 예상된다"고 경고했다.그러나 그는 또한 세계경제가 30년 전에 비해 일인당 석유사용 규모가 2/3로 줄어든 것 때문에, "현재와 같은 고유가 사태의 영향은 비록 무시할 수 없을 정도이긴 하지만 경제성장 및 인플레이션에 미치는 결과는 1970년대에 비해서는 상당히 낮은 수준일 것"이라고 낙관적인 전망을 덧붙였다.연준은 올해 초 배럴당 44달러하던 국제유가가 20달러나 급등한 사실에 대해 계속 우려를 표명하고 있는 중이다. 고유가는 성장을 둔화시키는 동시에 인플레이션 압력을 상승시키는 요인이다.최근 연준은 이러한 요인 중에서 인플레 쪽에 비중을 두면서 금리인상 추세를 지속할 것이란 입장을 선명하게 드러냈다.그린스펀은 지난 1985년 유가 급락사태를 지적하며 미국의 GDP 1달러 중 에너지 소비를 나타내는 에너지 원단위(energy intensity)가 낮아진 점에 대해 지적했다. 이처럼 유가가 상승할 수록 "에너지 원단위의 좀 더 급격한 하락세가 거의 불가피해 보인다"고 그는 말했다.특히 그린스펀은 최근 미국의 휘발유 소비가 현저하게 줄어든 사실을 지적하면서, 이 같은 원단위 하락세가 진행형임을 강조했다.또한 소비의 감소가 경제활동의 위축보다는 소비자들의 보수적인 태도로 인한 것이라면 연준은 소비자들이 고유가를 제대로 극복하고 있다고 보고 좀 더 편안하게 금리를 올릴 수 있을 것으로 예상된다.그린스펀 의장은 장기적인 안목에서는 "역사가 하나의 지침이 된다면 석유는 매장석유가 고갈되기 전에 결국 좀 더 비용이 낮은 대체연료로 대체될 것"이라며, "21세기 중반 이전에 이 같은 주력 에너지원의 대체과정이 개시될 것으로 본다"고 말했다.그는 아직도 석탄 매장량이 풍부한데도 석유가 이를 대체한 것은, 나무가 많아도 석탄이 이를 대체한 것처럼 그 에너지 효율성과 낮은 비용 때문이라고 설명했다.하지만 그린스펀 의장은 이러한 새로운 에너지원으로의 이행 과정은 장기간이 소요될 뿐 아니라 중국과 같은 높은 에너지 원단위를 가진 경제의 출현으로 인해 그 속도가 더 느려질 수 있다고 경고했다.이런 점에서 "세계경제는 당분간 석유시장에 대한 지정학적인 그리고 또다른 불확실성 속에 살아가야 할 것"으로 보인다고 그는 지적했다.Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan: EnergyBefore the Japan Business Federation, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, Tokyo, JapanOctober 17, 2005 Even before the devastating hurricanes of August and September 2005, world oil markets had been subject to a degree of strain not experienced for a generation. Increased demand and lagging additions to productive capacity had eliminated a significant amount of the slack in world oil markets that had been essential in containing crude oil and product prices between 1985 and 2000. In such tight markets, the shutdown of oil platforms and refineries last month by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was an accident waiting to happen. In their aftermath, prices of crude oil worldwide moved sharply higher, and with refineries stressed by a shortage of capacity, margins for refined products in the United States roughly doubled. Prices of natural gas soared as well. Oil prices had been persistently edging higher since 2002 as increases in global oil consumption progressively absorbed the buffer of several million barrels a day in excess capacity that stood between production and demand. Any pickup in consumption or shortfall in production for a commodity as price inelastic in the short run as oil was bound to be immediately reflected in a spike in prices. Such a price spike effectively represented a tax that drained purchasing power from oil consumers. Although the global economic expansion appears to have been on a reasonably firm path through the summer months, the recent surge in energy prices will undoubtedly be a drag from now on. In the United States, Japan, and elsewhere, the effect on growth would have been greater had oil not declined in importance as an input to world economic activity since the 1970s. How did we arrive at a state in which the balance of world energy supply and demand could be so fragile that weather, not to mention individual acts of sabotage or local insurrection, could have a significant impact on economic growth? Even so large a weather event as August and September's hurricanes, had they occurred in earlier decades of ample oil capacity, would have had hardly noticeable effects on crude prices if producers placed their excess supplies on the market or on product prices if idle refinery capacity were activated. The history of the world petroleum industry is one of a rapidly growing industry seeking the stable prices that have been seen by producers as essential to the expansion of the market. In the early twentieth century, pricing power was firmly in the hands of Americans, predominately John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil. Reportedly appalled by the volatility of crude oil prices that stunted the growth of oil markets in the early years of the petroleum industry, Rockefeller had endeavored with some success to stabilize those prices by gaining control by the turn of the century of nine-tenths of U.S. refining capacity. But even after the breakup of the Standard Oil monopoly in 1911, pricing power remained with the United States--first with the U.S. oil companies and later with the Texas Railroad Commission, which raised limits on output to suppress price spikes and cut output to prevent sharp price declines. Indeed, as late as 1952, crude oil production in the United States (44 percent of which was in Texas) still accounted for more than half of the world total. Excess Texas crude oil capacity was notably brought to bear to contain the impact on oil prices of the nationalization of Iranian oil a half-century ago. Again, excess American oil was released to the market to counter the price pressures induced by the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Of course, concentrated control in the hands of a few producers over any resource can pose potential problems. In the event, that historical role ended in 1971, when excess crude oil capacity in the United States was finally absorbed by rising world demand. At that point, the marginal pricing of oil, which for so long had been under the control of international oil companies, predominantly American, abruptly shifted to a few large Middle East producers and to greater market forces than those that they and the other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could contain. To capitalize on their newly acquired pricing power, many producing nations, especially in the Middle East, nationalized their oil companies. But the full magnitude of the pricing power of the nationalized oil companies became evident only in the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973. During that period, posted crude oil prices at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, rose to more than $11 per barrel, a level significantly above the $1.80 per barrel that had been unchanged from 1961 to 1970. The further surge in oil prices that accompanied the Iranian Revolution in 1979 eventually drove up prices to $39 per barrel by February 1981 ($75 per barrel in today's prices). The higher prices of the 1970s abruptly ended the extraordinary growth of U.S. and world consumption of oil and the increased intensity of its use that was so evident in the decades immediately following World War II. Since the more than tenfold increase in crude oil prices between 1972 and 1981, world oil consumption per real dollar equivalent of global gross domestic produce (GDP) has declined by approximately one-third. In the United States, between 1945 and 1973, consumption of petroleum products rose at a startling average annual rate of 4-1/2 percent, well in excess of growth of our real GDP. However, between 1973 and 2004, oil consumption grew in the United States, on average, at only 1/2 percent per year, far short of the rise in real GDP. In consequence, the ratio of U.S. oil consumption to GDP fell by half. Much of the decline in the ratio of oil use to real GDP in the United States has resulted from growth in the proportion of GDP composed of services, high-tech goods, and other presumably less oil-intensive industries. Additionally, part of the decline in this ratio is due to improved energy conservation for a given set of economic activities, including greater home insulation, better gasoline mileage, more efficient machinery, and streamlined production processes. These trends have been ongoing but have likely intensified of late with the sharp, recent increases in oil prices. In Japan, which until recently was the world's second largest oil consumer, the growth of demand was also strong before the developments of the 1970s. Subsequently, shocked by the increase in prices and without indigenous production to cushion the effects on incomes, Japan sharply curtailed the growth of its oil use, reducing the ratio of oil consumption to GDP by about half as well. Although the production quotas of OPEC have been a significant factor in price determination for a third of a century, the story since 1973 has been as much about the power of markets as it has been about power over markets. The incentives to alter oil consumption provided by market prices eventually resolved even the most seemingly insurmountable difficulties posed by inadequate supply outside the OPEC cartel. Many observers feared that the gap projected between supply and demand in the immediate post-1973 period would be so large that rationing would be the only practical solution. But the resolution did not occur that way. In the United States, to be sure, mandated fuel-efficiency standards for cars and light trucks induced the slower growth of gasoline demand. Some observers argue, however, that, even without government-enforced standards, market forces would have led to increased fuel efficiency. Indeed, the number of small, fuel-efficient Japanese cars that were imported into U.S. markets rose throughout the 1970s as the price of oil moved higher. Moreover, at that time, prices were expected to go still higher. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy in 1979 had projections showing real oil prices reaching nearly $60 per barrel by 1995--the equivalent of more than $120 in today's prices. The failure of oil prices to rise as projected in the late 1970s is a testament to the power of markets and the technologies they foster. Today, the average price of crude oil, despite its recent surge, is still in real terms below the price peak of February 1981. Moreover, since oil use, as I noted, is only two-thirds as important an input into world GDP as it was three decades ago, the effect of the current surge in oil prices, though noticeable, is likely to prove significantly less consequential to economic growth and inflation than the surge in the 1970s. The petroleum industry's early years of hit-or-miss exploration and development of oil and gas has given way to a more systematic, high-tech approach. The dramatic changes in technology in recent years have made existing oil and natural gas reserves stretch further while keeping energy costs lower than they otherwise would have been. Seismic imaging and advanced drilling techniques are facilitating the discovery of promising new reservoirs and are enabling the continued development of mature fields. Accordingly, one might expect that the cost of developing new fields and, hence, the long-term price of new oil and gas would have declined. And, indeed, these costs have declined, though less than they might otherwise have done. Much of the innovation in oil development outside OPEC, for example, has been directed at overcoming an increasingly inhospitable and costly exploratory environment, the consequence of more than a century of draining the more immediately accessible sources of crude oil. Still, consistent with declining long-term marginal costs of extraction, distant futures prices for crude oil moved lower, on net, during the 1990s. The most-distant futures prices fell from a bit more than $20 per barrel before the first Gulf War to less than $18 a barrel on average in 1999. Such long-term price stability has eroded noticeably over the past five years. Between 1991 and 2000, although spot prices ranged between $11 and $35 per barrel, distant futures exhibited little variation. Since then, distant futures prices have risen sharply. In early August, prices for delivery in 2011 of light sweet crude breached $60 per barrel, in line with recent increases in spot prices. This surge arguably reflects the growing presumption that increases in crude oil capacity outside OPEC will no longer be adequate to serve rising world demand going forward, especially from emerging Asia. Additionally, the longer-term crude price has presumably been driven up by renewed fears of supply disruptions in the Middle East and elsewhere. But the opportunities for profitable exploration and development in the industrial economies are dwindling, and the international oil companies are currently largely prohibited, restricted, or face considerable political risk in investing in OPEC and other developing countries. In such a highly profitable market environment for oil producers, one would have expected a far greater surge of oil investments. Indeed, some producers have significantly ratcheted up their investment plans. But because of the geographic concentration of proved reserves, much of the investment in crude oil productive capacity required to meet demand, without prices rising unduly, will need to be undertaken by national oil companies in OPEC and other developing economies. Although investment is rising, the significant proportion of oil revenues invested in financial assets suggests that many governments perceive that the benefits of investing in additional capacity to meet rising world oil demand are limited. Moreover, much oil revenue has been diverted to meet the perceived high-priority needs of rapidly growing populations. Unless those policies, political institutions, and attitudes change, it is difficult to envision adequate reinvestment into the oil facilities of these economies. Besides feared shortfalls in crude oil capacity, the status of world refining capacity has become worrisome as well. Crude oil production has been rising faster than refining capacity over the past decade. A continuation of this trend would soon make lack of refining capacity the binding constraint on growth in oil use. This may already be happening in certain grades, given the growing mismatch between the heavier and more sour content of world crude oil production and the rising world demand for lighter, sweeter petroleum products. There is thus an especial need to add adequate coking and desulphurization capacity to convert the average gravity and sulphur content of much of the world's crude oil to the lighter and sweeter needs of product markets, which are increasingly dominated by transportation fuels that must meet ever more stringent environmental requirements. Yet the expansion and the modernization of world refineries are lagging. For example, no new refinery has been built in the United States since 1976. The consequence of lagging modernization is reflected in a significant widening of the price spread between the higher priced light sweet crudes such as Brent and the heavier crudes such as Maya. To be sure, refining capacity continues to expand, albeit gradually, and exploration and development activities are ongoing, even in developed industrial countries. Conversion of the vast Athabasca oil sands reserves in Alberta to productive capacity, while slow, has made this unconventional source of oil highly competitive at current market prices. However, despite improved technology and high prices, proved reserves in the developed countries are being depleted because additions to these reserves have not kept pace with production. * * *The production, demand, and price outlook for oil beyond the current market turbulence will doubtless continue to reflect longer-term concerns. Much will depend on the response of demand to price over the longer run. If history is any guide, should higher prices persist, energy use over time will continue to decline relative to GDP. In the wake of sharply higher prices, the oil intensity of the U.S. economy, as I pointed out earlier, has been reduced by about half since the early 1970s. Much of that displacement was achieved by 1985. Progress in reducing oil intensity has continued since then, but at a lessened pace. For example, after the initial surge in the fuel efficiencies of our light motor vehicles during the 1980s, reflecting the earlier run-up in oil prices, improvements have since slowed to a trickle. The more-modest rate of decline in the energy intensity of the U.S. economy after 1985 should not be surprising, given the generally lower level of real oil prices that have prevailed since then. With real energy prices again on the rise, more-rapid decreases in the intensity of energy use in the years ahead seem virtually inevitable. Long-term demand elasticities over the past three decades have proved noticeably higher than those evident in the short term. Indeed, gasoline consumption has declined markedly in the United States in recent weeks, presumably partly as a consequence of higher prices. * * *Altering the magnitude and manner of energy consumption will significantly affect the path of the global economy over the long term. For years, long-term prospects for oil and natural gas prices appeared benign. When choosing capital projects, businesses in the past could mostly look through short-run fluctuations in oil and natural gas prices, with an anticipation that moderate prices would prevail over the longer haul. The recent shift in expectations, however, has been substantial enough and persistent enough to direct business-investment decisions in favor of energy-cost reduction. Over the past decade, energy consumed, measured in British thermal units, per real dollar of gross nonfinancial, non-energy corporate product in the United States has declined substantially, and this trend may be expected to accelerate in coming years. In Japan, as well, energy use has declined as a fraction of GDP, but these savings were largely achieved in previous decades, and energy intensity has been flat more recently. We can expect similar increases in oil efficiency in the rapidly growing economies of East Asia as they respond to the same set of market incentives. But at present, China consumes roughly twice as much oil per dollar of GDP as the United States, and if, as projected, its share of world GDP continues to increase, the average improvements in world oil-intensity will be less pronounced than the improvements in individual countries, viewed separately, would suggest. * * *We cannot judge with certainty how technological possibilities will play out in the future, but we can say with some assurance that developments in energy markets will remain central in determining the longer-run health of our nations' economies. The experience of the past fifty years--and indeed much longer than that--affirms that market forces play a key role in conserving scarce energy resources, directing those resources to their most highly valued uses. However, the availability of adequate productive capacity will also be driven by nonmarket influences and by other policy considerations. To be sure, energy issues present policymakers with difficult tradeoffs to consider. The concentration of oil reserves in politically volatile areas of the world is an ongoing concern. But that concern and others, one hopes, will be addressed in a manner that, to the greatest extent possible, does not distort or stifle the meaningful functioning of our markets. Barring political impediments to the operation of markets, the same price signals that are so critical for balancing energy supply and demand in the short run also signal profit opportunities for long-term supply expansion. Moreover, they stimulate the research and development that will unlock new approaches to energy production and use that we can now only barely envision. Improving technology and ongoing shifts in the structure of economic activity are reducing the energy intensity of industrial countries, and presumably recent oil price increases will accelerate the pace of displacement of energy-intensive production facilities. If history is any guide, oil will eventually be overtaken by less-costly alternatives well before conventional oil reserves run out. Indeed, oil displaced coal despite still vast untapped reserves of coal, and coal displaced wood without denuding our forest lands. New technologies to more fully exploit existing conventional oil reserves will emerge in the years ahead. Moreover, innovation is already altering the power source of motor vehicles, and much research is directed at reducing gasoline requirements. We will begin the transition to the next major sources of energy, perhaps before midcentury, as production from conventional oil reservoirs, according to central-tendency scenarios of the U.S. Department of Energy, is projected to peak. In fact, the development and application of new sources of energy, especially nonconventional sources of oil, is already in train. Nonetheless, the transition will take time. We, and the rest of the world, doubtless will have to live with the geopolitical and other uncertainties of the oil markets for some time to come. [뉴스핌 Newspim] 김사헌 기자 herra79@newspim.com

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'지각대장' 푸틴, 새벽에 평양 지각 도착 [서울=뉴스핌] 이영종 통일전문기자 = 블라디미르 푸틴 대통령이 19일 새벽 평양 순안공항에 도착해 김정은 북한 국무위원장과 만났다고 크렘린궁과 러시아 매체 등 외신이 전했다. 크렘린궁 측이 공개한 영상에 따르면 푸틴은 예정보다 늦은 이날 새벽 2시45분께 전용기인 일류신(IL)-96 항공기로 도착했으며, 공항 활주로에서 영접 나온 김정은과 환영 의식을 가졌다. [서울=뉴스핌] 19일 새벽 평양 순안공항에 도착한 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령이 영접 나온 김정은 북한 국무위원장과 포옹하고 있다. 두 사람은 이날 정상회담을 갖는다. [사진=크렘린궁] 2024.06.19 김정은과 푸틴은 환영 행사를 위해 의장대가 도열한 레드카펫을 걸어가면서도 이야기를 나누었으며, 푸틴의 이야기를 통역을 통해 들은 김정은이 고개를 끄덕이는 장면도 드러났다. 두 정상은 푸틴의 전용차량인 러시아산 '아우루스' 차량에 서로 먼저 탈 것을 청하며 한동안 옥신각신 했고 결국 푸틴이 먼저 탑승해 뒷좌석 오른쪽에 앉았다고 현지에서 취재한 매체들은 전했다.  푸틴은 김정은의 안내로 숙소인 금수산영빈관에 묵었다. 지난해 9월 러시아 아무르주 보스토치니 우주센터에서 만난 이후 9개월 만에 재회한 김정은과 푸틴은 19일 정상회담을 하고 북러 간 포괄적 전략동반자 관계에 서명하는 등의 결과를 공동으로 발표할 예정이다. 푸틴의 방북은 지난 2000년 7월 첫 평양 방문에 이어 두 번째로 우크라이나 침공 이후 북한의 대러 무기 제공 등으로 밀착관계를 보여온 북러 정상 간의 논의 결과에 관심이 쏠리고 있다. yjlee@newspim.com 2024-06-19 06:03
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尹 지지율 35.2% 제자리걸음…'동해 석유' 발표 별무신통 [서울=뉴스핌] 박성준 기자 = 윤석열 대통령의 지지율이 소폭 상승해 30%대 중반을 기록했다는 여론조사 결과가 13일 발표됐다. 종합뉴스통신 뉴스핌 의뢰로 여론조사 전문업체 미디어리서치가 지난 10~11일 전국 만 18세 이상 남녀 1001명에게 물은 결과 윤 대통령의 국정운영에 대한 긍정평가는 35.2%로 집계됐다. 부정평가는 62.2%로 나타났다. '잘 모름'에 답한 비율은 2.6%다. 지난 조사 대비 긍정평가는 0.1%포인트(p) 상승했고 부정평가는 0.6%p 하락했다. 긍정평가와 부정평가 간 격차는 27.0%p다. 연령별로 보면 40대에서 긍·부정 평가 격차가 극명하게 드러났다. 만 18세~29세에서 '잘함'은 26.5% '잘 못함' 72.1%였고, 30대에서는 '잘함' 32.3% '잘 못함' 64.4%였다. 40대는 '잘함' 22.5% '잘 못함' 75.3%, 50대는 '잘함' 32.3% '잘 못함' 66.5%로 집계됐다. 60대는 '잘함' 45.5% '잘 못함' 51.4%였고, 70대 이상에서는 '잘함'이 55.0%로 '잘 못함'(40.1%)보다 높게 나타났다. 지역별로는 서울 '잘함' 37.0%, '잘 못함'은 60.1%로 집계됐다. 경기·인천 '잘함' 32.6% '잘 못함' 66.2%, 대전·충청·세종 '잘함' 34.8% '잘 못함' 63.6%, 부산·울산·경남 '잘함' 35.7% '잘 못함' 59.9%로 나타났다. 대구·경북은 '잘함' 51.9% '잘 못함' 45.6%, 전남·광주·전북 '잘함' 21.9% '잘 못함' 75.1%로 나타났다. 강원·제주는 '잘함' 38.0% '잘 못함' 54.6%로 집계됐다. 성별로도 남녀 모두 부정평가가 우세했다. 남성은 '잘함' 32.4% '잘 못함' 65.7%, 여성은 '잘함' 38.0% '잘 못함' 58.8%였다. 김대은 미디어리서치 대표는 윤 대통령 지지율 결과에 대해 "포항 영일만 앞바다의 석유, 천연가스 매장 가능성 국정브리핑과 북한의 오물풍선 살포로 인한 9·19 군사합의 파기 등의 이슈를 거치면서 지지율 반등을 노릴 수 있었다"며 "그러나 액트지오사에 탐사 분석을 맡긴 배경에 대한 의혹이 증폭되고 있고, 육군 훈련병 영결식에 참석하는 대신 여당 워크숍에 가는 모습 등 때문에 민심이 움직이지 않았다"고 평가했다. 차재권 부경대 정치외교학과 교수는 "앞으로 큰 이슈가 발생하지 않는다면 지지율은 떨어지지도, 올라가지도 않을 것 같다"며 "많은 국민이 기대도 하지 않고 그렇다고 아예 버리지도 못하고 있는 상황으로 보인다. 지지율이 올라가려면 획기적 변화가 있어야 한다"고 분석했다. 이번 여론조사는 성·연령·지역별 인구비례 할당 추출 방식으로 추출된 표본을 구조화된 설문지를 이용한 무선(100%) ARS 전화조사 방식으로 실시했으며 응답률은 3.4%, 표본오차는 95% 신뢰수준에 ±3.1%p다. 통계보정은 2024년 1월말 행정안전부 주민등록 인구통계를 기준으로 성별 연령별 지역별 가중 값을 부여(셀가중)했다. 자세한 내용은 중앙선거여론조사심의위원회 홈페이지를 참조하면 된다. parksj@newspim.com 2024-06-13 06:00
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