고유가는 세계경제 성장을 둔화시킬 수 있고, 계속해서 대체 연료로의 전환을 가속화시킬 것으로 보인다고 앨런 그린스펀(Alan Greenspan) 美 연준 의장이 18일 일본에서 가진 연설을 통해 지적했다.그린스펀 의장은 이날 도쿄에서 일본상공회의소 및 게이단렌(經團聯) 초청 강연에서 "비록 세계경제의 확장 국면이 올해 여름을 거치면서 상당히 강화된 것으로 보이지만, 최근 에너지물가의 급등은 명백히 경제성장을 둔화시킬 것으로 예상된다"고 경고했다.그러나 그는 또한 세계경제가 30년 전에 비해 일인당 석유사용 규모가 2/3로 줄어든 것 때문에, "현재와 같은 고유가 사태의 영향은 비록 무시할 수 없을 정도이긴 하지만 경제성장 및 인플레이션에 미치는 결과는 1970년대에 비해서는 상당히 낮은 수준일 것"이라고 낙관적인 전망을 덧붙였다.연준은 올해 초 배럴당 44달러하던 국제유가가 20달러나 급등한 사실에 대해 계속 우려를 표명하고 있는 중이다. 고유가는 성장을 둔화시키는 동시에 인플레이션 압력을 상승시키는 요인이다.최근 연준은 이러한 요인 중에서 인플레 쪽에 비중을 두면서 금리인상 추세를 지속할 것이란 입장을 선명하게 드러냈다.그린스펀은 지난 1985년 유가 급락사태를 지적하며 미국의 GDP 1달러 중 에너지 소비를 나타내는 에너지 원단위(energy intensity)가 낮아진 점에 대해 지적했다. 이처럼 유가가 상승할 수록 "에너지 원단위의 좀 더 급격한 하락세가 거의 불가피해 보인다"고 그는 말했다.특히 그린스펀은 최근 미국의 휘발유 소비가 현저하게 줄어든 사실을 지적하면서, 이 같은 원단위 하락세가 진행형임을 강조했다.또한 소비의 감소가 경제활동의 위축보다는 소비자들의 보수적인 태도로 인한 것이라면 연준은 소비자들이 고유가를 제대로 극복하고 있다고 보고 좀 더 편안하게 금리를 올릴 수 있을 것으로 예상된다.그린스펀 의장은 장기적인 안목에서는 "역사가 하나의 지침이 된다면 석유는 매장석유가 고갈되기 전에 결국 좀 더 비용이 낮은 대체연료로 대체될 것"이라며, "21세기 중반 이전에 이 같은 주력 에너지원의 대체과정이 개시될 것으로 본다"고 말했다.그는 아직도 석탄 매장량이 풍부한데도 석유가 이를 대체한 것은, 나무가 많아도 석탄이 이를 대체한 것처럼 그 에너지 효율성과 낮은 비용 때문이라고 설명했다.하지만 그린스펀 의장은 이러한 새로운 에너지원으로의 이행 과정은 장기간이 소요될 뿐 아니라 중국과 같은 높은 에너지 원단위를 가진 경제의 출현으로 인해 그 속도가 더 느려질 수 있다고 경고했다.이런 점에서 "세계경제는 당분간 석유시장에 대한 지정학적인 그리고 또다른 불확실성 속에 살아가야 할 것"으로 보인다고 그는 지적했다.Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan: EnergyBefore the Japan Business Federation, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, Tokyo, JapanOctober 17, 2005 Even before the devastating hurricanes of August and September 2005, world oil markets had been subject to a degree of strain not experienced for a generation. Increased demand and lagging additions to productive capacity had eliminated a significant amount of the slack in world oil markets that had been essential in containing crude oil and product prices between 1985 and 2000. In such tight markets, the shutdown of oil platforms and refineries last month by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was an accident waiting to happen. In their aftermath, prices of crude oil worldwide moved sharply higher, and with refineries stressed by a shortage of capacity, margins for refined products in the United States roughly doubled. Prices of natural gas soared as well. Oil prices had been persistently edging higher since 2002 as increases in global oil consumption progressively absorbed the buffer of several million barrels a day in excess capacity that stood between production and demand. Any pickup in consumption or shortfall in production for a commodity as price inelastic in the short run as oil was bound to be immediately reflected in a spike in prices. Such a price spike effectively represented a tax that drained purchasing power from oil consumers. Although the global economic expansion appears to have been on a reasonably firm path through the summer months, the recent surge in energy prices will undoubtedly be a drag from now on. In the United States, Japan, and elsewhere, the effect on growth would have been greater had oil not declined in importance as an input to world economic activity since the 1970s. How did we arrive at a state in which the balance of world energy supply and demand could be so fragile that weather, not to mention individual acts of sabotage or local insurrection, could have a significant impact on economic growth? Even so large a weather event as August and September's hurricanes, had they occurred in earlier decades of ample oil capacity, would have had hardly noticeable effects on crude prices if producers placed their excess supplies on the market or on product prices if idle refinery capacity were activated. The history of the world petroleum industry is one of a rapidly growing industry seeking the stable prices that have been seen by producers as essential to the expansion of the market. In the early twentieth century, pricing power was firmly in the hands of Americans, predominately John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil. Reportedly appalled by the volatility of crude oil prices that stunted the growth of oil markets in the early years of the petroleum industry, Rockefeller had endeavored with some success to stabilize those prices by gaining control by the turn of the century of nine-tenths of U.S. refining capacity. But even after the breakup of the Standard Oil monopoly in 1911, pricing power remained with the United States--first with the U.S. oil companies and later with the Texas Railroad Commission, which raised limits on output to suppress price spikes and cut output to prevent sharp price declines. Indeed, as late as 1952, crude oil production in the United States (44 percent of which was in Texas) still accounted for more than half of the world total. Excess Texas crude oil capacity was notably brought to bear to contain the impact on oil prices of the nationalization of Iranian oil a half-century ago. Again, excess American oil was released to the market to counter the price pressures induced by the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Of course, concentrated control in the hands of a few producers over any resource can pose potential problems. In the event, that historical role ended in 1971, when excess crude oil capacity in the United States was finally absorbed by rising world demand. At that point, the marginal pricing of oil, which for so long had been under the control of international oil companies, predominantly American, abruptly shifted to a few large Middle East producers and to greater market forces than those that they and the other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could contain. To capitalize on their newly acquired pricing power, many producing nations, especially in the Middle East, nationalized their oil companies. But the full magnitude of the pricing power of the nationalized oil companies became evident only in the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973. During that period, posted crude oil prices at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, rose to more than $11 per barrel, a level significantly above the $1.80 per barrel that had been unchanged from 1961 to 1970. The further surge in oil prices that accompanied the Iranian Revolution in 1979 eventually drove up prices to $39 per barrel by February 1981 ($75 per barrel in today's prices). The higher prices of the 1970s abruptly ended the extraordinary growth of U.S. and world consumption of oil and the increased intensity of its use that was so evident in the decades immediately following World War II. Since the more than tenfold increase in crude oil prices between 1972 and 1981, world oil consumption per real dollar equivalent of global gross domestic produce (GDP) has declined by approximately one-third. In the United States, between 1945 and 1973, consumption of petroleum products rose at a startling average annual rate of 4-1/2 percent, well in excess of growth of our real GDP. However, between 1973 and 2004, oil consumption grew in the United States, on average, at only 1/2 percent per year, far short of the rise in real GDP. In consequence, the ratio of U.S. oil consumption to GDP fell by half. Much of the decline in the ratio of oil use to real GDP in the United States has resulted from growth in the proportion of GDP composed of services, high-tech goods, and other presumably less oil-intensive industries. Additionally, part of the decline in this ratio is due to improved energy conservation for a given set of economic activities, including greater home insulation, better gasoline mileage, more efficient machinery, and streamlined production processes. These trends have been ongoing but have likely intensified of late with the sharp, recent increases in oil prices. In Japan, which until recently was the world's second largest oil consumer, the growth of demand was also strong before the developments of the 1970s. Subsequently, shocked by the increase in prices and without indigenous production to cushion the effects on incomes, Japan sharply curtailed the growth of its oil use, reducing the ratio of oil consumption to GDP by about half as well. Although the production quotas of OPEC have been a significant factor in price determination for a third of a century, the story since 1973 has been as much about the power of markets as it has been about power over markets. The incentives to alter oil consumption provided by market prices eventually resolved even the most seemingly insurmountable difficulties posed by inadequate supply outside the OPEC cartel. Many observers feared that the gap projected between supply and demand in the immediate post-1973 period would be so large that rationing would be the only practical solution. But the resolution did not occur that way. In the United States, to be sure, mandated fuel-efficiency standards for cars and light trucks induced the slower growth of gasoline demand. Some observers argue, however, that, even without government-enforced standards, market forces would have led to increased fuel efficiency. Indeed, the number of small, fuel-efficient Japanese cars that were imported into U.S. markets rose throughout the 1970s as the price of oil moved higher. Moreover, at that time, prices were expected to go still higher. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy in 1979 had projections showing real oil prices reaching nearly $60 per barrel by 1995--the equivalent of more than $120 in today's prices. The failure of oil prices to rise as projected in the late 1970s is a testament to the power of markets and the technologies they foster. Today, the average price of crude oil, despite its recent surge, is still in real terms below the price peak of February 1981. Moreover, since oil use, as I noted, is only two-thirds as important an input into world GDP as it was three decades ago, the effect of the current surge in oil prices, though noticeable, is likely to prove significantly less consequential to economic growth and inflation than the surge in the 1970s. The petroleum industry's early years of hit-or-miss exploration and development of oil and gas has given way to a more systematic, high-tech approach. The dramatic changes in technology in recent years have made existing oil and natural gas reserves stretch further while keeping energy costs lower than they otherwise would have been. Seismic imaging and advanced drilling techniques are facilitating the discovery of promising new reservoirs and are enabling the continued development of mature fields. Accordingly, one might expect that the cost of developing new fields and, hence, the long-term price of new oil and gas would have declined. And, indeed, these costs have declined, though less than they might otherwise have done. Much of the innovation in oil development outside OPEC, for example, has been directed at overcoming an increasingly inhospitable and costly exploratory environment, the consequence of more than a century of draining the more immediately accessible sources of crude oil. Still, consistent with declining long-term marginal costs of extraction, distant futures prices for crude oil moved lower, on net, during the 1990s. The most-distant futures prices fell from a bit more than $20 per barrel before the first Gulf War to less than $18 a barrel on average in 1999. Such long-term price stability has eroded noticeably over the past five years. Between 1991 and 2000, although spot prices ranged between $11 and $35 per barrel, distant futures exhibited little variation. Since then, distant futures prices have risen sharply. In early August, prices for delivery in 2011 of light sweet crude breached $60 per barrel, in line with recent increases in spot prices. This surge arguably reflects the growing presumption that increases in crude oil capacity outside OPEC will no longer be adequate to serve rising world demand going forward, especially from emerging Asia. Additionally, the longer-term crude price has presumably been driven up by renewed fears of supply disruptions in the Middle East and elsewhere. But the opportunities for profitable exploration and development in the industrial economies are dwindling, and the international oil companies are currently largely prohibited, restricted, or face considerable political risk in investing in OPEC and other developing countries. In such a highly profitable market environment for oil producers, one would have expected a far greater surge of oil investments. Indeed, some producers have significantly ratcheted up their investment plans. But because of the geographic concentration of proved reserves, much of the investment in crude oil productive capacity required to meet demand, without prices rising unduly, will need to be undertaken by national oil companies in OPEC and other developing economies. Although investment is rising, the significant proportion of oil revenues invested in financial assets suggests that many governments perceive that the benefits of investing in additional capacity to meet rising world oil demand are limited. Moreover, much oil revenue has been diverted to meet the perceived high-priority needs of rapidly growing populations. Unless those policies, political institutions, and attitudes change, it is difficult to envision adequate reinvestment into the oil facilities of these economies. Besides feared shortfalls in crude oil capacity, the status of world refining capacity has become worrisome as well. Crude oil production has been rising faster than refining capacity over the past decade. A continuation of this trend would soon make lack of refining capacity the binding constraint on growth in oil use. This may already be happening in certain grades, given the growing mismatch between the heavier and more sour content of world crude oil production and the rising world demand for lighter, sweeter petroleum products. There is thus an especial need to add adequate coking and desulphurization capacity to convert the average gravity and sulphur content of much of the world's crude oil to the lighter and sweeter needs of product markets, which are increasingly dominated by transportation fuels that must meet ever more stringent environmental requirements. Yet the expansion and the modernization of world refineries are lagging. For example, no new refinery has been built in the United States since 1976. The consequence of lagging modernization is reflected in a significant widening of the price spread between the higher priced light sweet crudes such as Brent and the heavier crudes such as Maya. To be sure, refining capacity continues to expand, albeit gradually, and exploration and development activities are ongoing, even in developed industrial countries. Conversion of the vast Athabasca oil sands reserves in Alberta to productive capacity, while slow, has made this unconventional source of oil highly competitive at current market prices. However, despite improved technology and high prices, proved reserves in the developed countries are being depleted because additions to these reserves have not kept pace with production. * * *The production, demand, and price outlook for oil beyond the current market turbulence will doubtless continue to reflect longer-term concerns. Much will depend on the response of demand to price over the longer run. If history is any guide, should higher prices persist, energy use over time will continue to decline relative to GDP. In the wake of sharply higher prices, the oil intensity of the U.S. economy, as I pointed out earlier, has been reduced by about half since the early 1970s. Much of that displacement was achieved by 1985. Progress in reducing oil intensity has continued since then, but at a lessened pace. For example, after the initial surge in the fuel efficiencies of our light motor vehicles during the 1980s, reflecting the earlier run-up in oil prices, improvements have since slowed to a trickle. The more-modest rate of decline in the energy intensity of the U.S. economy after 1985 should not be surprising, given the generally lower level of real oil prices that have prevailed since then. With real energy prices again on the rise, more-rapid decreases in the intensity of energy use in the years ahead seem virtually inevitable. Long-term demand elasticities over the past three decades have proved noticeably higher than those evident in the short term. Indeed, gasoline consumption has declined markedly in the United States in recent weeks, presumably partly as a consequence of higher prices. * * *Altering the magnitude and manner of energy consumption will significantly affect the path of the global economy over the long term. For years, long-term prospects for oil and natural gas prices appeared benign. When choosing capital projects, businesses in the past could mostly look through short-run fluctuations in oil and natural gas prices, with an anticipation that moderate prices would prevail over the longer haul. The recent shift in expectations, however, has been substantial enough and persistent enough to direct business-investment decisions in favor of energy-cost reduction. Over the past decade, energy consumed, measured in British thermal units, per real dollar of gross nonfinancial, non-energy corporate product in the United States has declined substantially, and this trend may be expected to accelerate in coming years. In Japan, as well, energy use has declined as a fraction of GDP, but these savings were largely achieved in previous decades, and energy intensity has been flat more recently. We can expect similar increases in oil efficiency in the rapidly growing economies of East Asia as they respond to the same set of market incentives. But at present, China consumes roughly twice as much oil per dollar of GDP as the United States, and if, as projected, its share of world GDP continues to increase, the average improvements in world oil-intensity will be less pronounced than the improvements in individual countries, viewed separately, would suggest. * * *We cannot judge with certainty how technological possibilities will play out in the future, but we can say with some assurance that developments in energy markets will remain central in determining the longer-run health of our nations' economies. The experience of the past fifty years--and indeed much longer than that--affirms that market forces play a key role in conserving scarce energy resources, directing those resources to their most highly valued uses. However, the availability of adequate productive capacity will also be driven by nonmarket influences and by other policy considerations. To be sure, energy issues present policymakers with difficult tradeoffs to consider. The concentration of oil reserves in politically volatile areas of the world is an ongoing concern. But that concern and others, one hopes, will be addressed in a manner that, to the greatest extent possible, does not distort or stifle the meaningful functioning of our markets. Barring political impediments to the operation of markets, the same price signals that are so critical for balancing energy supply and demand in the short run also signal profit opportunities for long-term supply expansion. Moreover, they stimulate the research and development that will unlock new approaches to energy production and use that we can now only barely envision. Improving technology and ongoing shifts in the structure of economic activity are reducing the energy intensity of industrial countries, and presumably recent oil price increases will accelerate the pace of displacement of energy-intensive production facilities. If history is any guide, oil will eventually be overtaken by less-costly alternatives well before conventional oil reserves run out. Indeed, oil displaced coal despite still vast untapped reserves of coal, and coal displaced wood without denuding our forest lands. New technologies to more fully exploit existing conventional oil reserves will emerge in the years ahead. Moreover, innovation is already altering the power source of motor vehicles, and much research is directed at reducing gasoline requirements. We will begin the transition to the next major sources of energy, perhaps before midcentury, as production from conventional oil reservoirs, according to central-tendency scenarios of the U.S. Department of Energy, is projected to peak. In fact, the development and application of new sources of energy, especially nonconventional sources of oil, is already in train. Nonetheless, the transition will take time. We, and the rest of the world, doubtless will have to live with the geopolitical and other uncertainties of the oil markets for some time to come. [뉴스핌 Newspim] 김사헌 기자 herra79@newspim.com
[관련키워드]
[뉴스핌 베스트 기사]
사진
수능장에 '흑색 연필'만 허용된다고?
[서울=뉴스핌] 송주원 기자 = 2027학년도 대학수학능력시험(수능)을 하루 앞두고 시험장에 개인적으로 가져갈 수 있는 필기구가 흑색 연필로 제한된다는 긴급 지침이 일선 학교에 전달됐다.
이는 인공지능(AI) 등을 활용한 첨단 부정행위를 예방하기 위한 조치로 풀이되지만, 시험 직전 반입 기준이 바뀌면서 현장 혼란이 우려된다.
18일 교육계에 따르면 교육부는 전국 시도교육청을 거쳐 각급 학교에 '시험장 휴대 가능 물품 변경'이라는 제목의 안내문을 긴급 배포했다.
한성숙 국무총리가 17일 오후 서울 종로구 정부서울청사 합동브리핑실에서 수능 부정행위 대응 관련 대국민 담화를 하고 있다. [사진 = 뉴스핌DB]
당초 수험생은 흑색 연필을 비롯해 컴퓨터용 사인펜과 수정테이프, 지우개, 샤프심 등을 시험장에 가져갈 수 있었다. 그러나 새롭게 전달된 안내문에는 개인이 휴대할 수 있는 필기구로 흑색 연필만 기재됐다.
반입 대상에서 제외된 수정테이프와 지우개, 샤프심 등은 각 교육청이 일괄 구매해 시험장에 지급할 방침이다. 수험생이 개인적으로 준비하는 대신 시험장에서 제공하는 물품을 사용하도록 한 것이다.
이번 지침 변경은 지우개나 수정테이프 등 일상적인 필기구에 초소형 카메라를 은닉해 시험 문제를 외부로 유출하는 등 신종 부정행위가 발생할 가능성을 사전에 차단하려는 취지로 풀이된다.
다만 수능 시행을 불과 하루 앞둔 시점에 반입 가능 물품이 대폭 축소되면서 수험생들의 혼란이 불가피할 전망이다. 시험장 학교에서도 변경된 기준을 안내하고 필요한 물품을 확보·배부하는 등 추가적인 준비 부담이 발생할 것으로 보인다.
jane94@newspim.com
2026-11-18 10:38
사진
육사, 서울 태릉 떠나 충청권으로 이전
[서울=뉴스핌] 오동룡 군사방산전문기자 = 국방부가 육·해·공군 사관학교를 하나로 묶는 '국군사관학교'의 통합본교와 대학원을 대전 자운대에 두고, 서울 태릉의 육군사관학교는 충청권으로 옮기는 방안을 검토하기로 했다.
해군사관학교(진해)와 공군사관학교(청주)는 지금 자리에 남는다. 새 교육체계는 2029학년도 신입생부터 적용한다.
국방부는 18일 오전 강신철 국방부 장관, 권칠승 더불어민주당 정책위의장, 진성준 국회 국방위원장이 함께 주재한 당정협의에서 이런 내용의 '국군사관학교 창설 기본계획 수정안'을 논의했다고 밝혔다.
[서울=뉴스핌] 조승진 기자 = 더불어민주당과 정부가 18일 오전 서울 여의도 국회 의원회관에서 '미래 정예장교 양성, 국군사관학교 창설방안 당정협의'를 열고 있다. 이날 협의는 강신철 국방부 장관과 권칠승 더불어민주당 정책위의장, 진성준 국회 국방위원장이 함께 주재했다. 2026.11.18 gomsi@newspim.com
수정안은 지난 7월 당정협의에서 발표한 기본계획을 바탕으로 국회, 군 지휘부, 각 군 사관학교 관계자, 사관생도, 예비역, 민간 전문가 의견을 모아 손질한 것이다.
강 장관은 이 자리에서 "국군사관학교 창설은 대한민국 국방교육의 새로운 미래를 여는 중요한 사안"이라며 "방향은 명확하고 과감하게, 추진 과정은 면밀하고 신중하게 검토해야 한다"고 말했다. 국군사관학교의 목표로는 "헌법과 국민에 충성하고, 첨단과학기술과 인간에 대한 깊은 이해를 바탕으로 미래전의 승리를 주도할 정예장교 양성"을 제시했다.
◆ 1·4학년은 통합교육, 2·3학년은 각 군이 맡는다
수정안에 따르면 국군사관학교 아래에 통합교육을 맡는 통합본교와 대학원을 두고, 각 군 교육은 지역 캠퍼스가 맡는 '네트워크형' 구조로 짠다. 입학 직후인 1학년과 졸업 직전인 4학년은 육·해·공군 생도가 함께 교육받는다. 2·3학년 교육과 하계 군사훈련은 지금처럼 각 군이 주도한다. 합동성을 키우면서도 각 군의 고유한 특성은 살리겠다는 취지다.
미래전에 대비한 과학기술·전략 분야 석·박사 대학원도 새로 만든다. 교수진의 교육·연구 역량을 높이고, 학군·학사·육군3사관학교 등 다른 출신 장교에게도 심화교육 기회를 주기 위해 수용 인원을 단계적으로 늘린다는 계획이다.
◆ 국방부 직할로 전환하고 총장 임기는 최대 4년
국군사관학교는 각 군 소속이 아닌 국방부 직할기관으로 설치된다. 예산과 제도는 국방부가 책임지고, 교육부 등 관계 부처와 협의해 각 군 사이에 균형 잡힌 교육 여건을 갖춘다는 것이다.
총장에는 최고의 교육 전문가를 앉히고, 임기는 2년을 기본으로 하되 한 차례 연임을 허용해 최대 4년까지 맡을 수 있게 한다. 중장기 교육 비전을 흔들림 없이 추진하려는 장치다. 군무원 신분인 민간인 교수는 특정직 공무원으로 바꾸고 신규 교수도 뽑는다. 현역 교수는 연구 여건과 처우를 개선한다.
통합본교와 대학원 입지로 대전 자운대를 고른 데 대해 국방부는 "우수한 대학과 연구기관이 밀집해 교육과 연구의 시너지를 높일 수 있다"고 설명했다. 육군 지역 캠퍼스는 통합본교, 공군 캠퍼스(청주)와의 교육적 연계와 행정기관 이전 등을 고려해 충청권 이전을 검토한다. 모든 캠퍼스의 교육시설은 단계적으로 투자를 늘려 '스마트 캠퍼스'로 바꾼다.
◆ 2029학년도 신입생부터 적용, 해병대 생도는 따로 뽑는다
국방부는 수험생과 학부모의 혼란을 막기 위해 생도 선발은 지금처럼 각 군이 하도록 했다. 해병대 생도는 별도로 선발하고, 해병대 군사교육체계를 따로 만드는 방안도 검토한다. 해병대를 육·해·공군과 나란히 두는 '4군 체제' 전환을 뒷받침하기 위한 조치다.
강신철 장관은 "기존 교육의 틀을 넘어 스스로 미래의 안보 질문을 던지는 창의적 인재를 키워내겠다"며 "육·해·공군 생도들이 함께 땀 흘리며 하나의 전사공동체로 뭉쳐 어떤 전장에서도 승리하는 국군의 주역이 되도록 하겠다"고 했다. 국방부는 앞으로도 각계 의견을 더 들어 최종안을 확정할 방침이다.
gomsi@newspim.com
2026-11-18 10:32












